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Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall, and Continuing
Uses of Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws
Dr. JoAnne Sweeny*
Cohabitation is a reality for a majority of Americans. Nonmonogamous relationships are increasing over time, yet having a
sexual relationship outside of marriage is illegal in a surprising number
of states. Conservative groups or politicians also occasionally
champion these laws, ensuring their longevity. This enduring conflict of
values between the majority and a vocal minority is part of a cultural
trend that has existed for centuries. From colonial times to the present,
adultery and fornication laws have gone from being the most
prolifically enforced to being virtually ignored by prosecutors and held
to be unconstitutional invasions of privacy by judges. This Article
traces that progression by looking at how American culture has
changed over time, including judicial views on and changing
evidentiary standards for the crimes of adultery and fornication, both of
which have led to fewer prosecutions. The resulting picture indicates
why these laws are no longer regularly enforced and why they still
remain part of the criminal codes in several states, regardless of their
uncertain constitutional pedigree.
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INTRODUCTION
According to a recent survey by the Center for Disease Control,
cohabitation, either before marriage or as an alternative to marriage, has
become a popular living arrangement, particularly for young people.1
Nevertheless, a record low of 47% of adult women are married.2 The
increase in cohabitation, combined with the growing number of states
that recognize marriage for homosexual couples, has created a new
minority group: non-monogamous couples and couples who live
together but do not wish to get married. Although there is evidence that
public opinion regarding cohabitation has improved over time,3 the
stigma attached to both cohabitating and non-monogamous couples is
alive and well in the criminal laws of several states that outlaw adultery,
fornication, or cohabitation.
To many, adultery and fornication criminal laws are historical relics
1. Michelle Castillo, CDC: More Women Choosing Cohabitation Before Marriage, CBS
NEWS (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cdc-more-women-choosingcohabitation-before-marriage/.
2. Special to The Chicago Tribune, Leslie Mann, Nowadays, It’s ‘Last Comes Marriage’, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-01/news/ct-last-comes-marriagex-0101-20140101_1_big-wedding-couples-wedding-industry.
3. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of
Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 7 (2007); see also Elizabeth A. Pope,
Cohabitation: What to Do When Couples Cannot or Do Not Marry, DCBA BRIEF, Dec. 2007, at
22. Discrimination against couples in polyamorous or non-monogamous relationships is
apparently still a main concern. See Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory As A Sexual Orientation, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1514 (2011).
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from this Country’s earliest colonies. And yet, these laws have had
surprising longevity in many states.4 Typically unenforced, these laws
are sometimes still invoked by politicians or interest groups who seek a
“moral” platform to impress or mobilize their conservative constituents.
A number of recent examples exist. In 2009, the Minnesota Family
Council, in the face of efforts to repeal Minnesota’s fornication and
adultery laws, called for those laws to be strengthened instead.5 The
repeal efforts ultimately failed.6 In 2012, Bryan Fischer of the
American Family Association called for the re-criminalization of
homosexuality and fornication nationwide.7 Also in 2012, Alaskan
Governor Sean Parnell appointed a man to the state’s judicial
appointments panel who believed that extra-marital sex should be a
crime.8 Finally, as recently as 2013, two states’ sodomy laws9 were
used to arrest or convict people.10
Although they are probably unconstitutional violations of privacy

4. See Richard Green, Griswold’s Legacy: Fornication and Adultery as Crimes, 16 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 545, 546 (1989).
5. Jonathan Turley, The Scarlet Letter Lives On, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2010, at 09A,
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-04-26-column26_ST_
N.htm.
6. Id. Several other state legislatures have “proudly” refused to repeal existing sodomy laws,
even when the laws are undoubtedly unconstitutional. See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT
CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 281–82 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2012).
7. Patricia Nell Warren, HIV Prevention & the New Puritanism, BILERICO PROJ. (Sept. 9,
2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.bilerico.com/2012/09/hiv_prevention_the_new_puritanism.php.
8. Id.
9. Although this Article does not focus on criminal sodomy laws, this Article will occasionally
use those laws to supplement evidence of changing values regarding consensual sex between
adults.
10. See Laura Vozzella, Cuccinelli Seeks to Preserve Va. Sodomy Law, WASH. POST (June 25,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/va-politics/cuccinelli-seeks-to-preserve-va-sodomylaw/2013/06/25/e410762a-ddd5-11e2-b197-f248b21f94c4_story.html
(discussing
Virginia
Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli II’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court aimed at preserving
Virginia’s anti-sodomy law); see also Ali Vitali, Sodomy Laws May Be Illegal, but That’s Not
Stopping Baton Rouge, MSNBC (July 28, 2013, 5:41 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harrisperry/sodomy-laws-may-be-illegal-thats-not (noting that Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department
charged gay men with “crimes against nature” in sting operation for attempting to have
consensual sexual relationships with undercover police officers). The persistence of these laws
has also caused the United States to be criticized for its own condemnation of other countries’
treatment of homosexuals. See Max Seddon, Putin Says He Has Gay Friends but Equates Gay
People to Pedophiles, BUZZFEED (Jan. 19, 2014, 11:24 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
maxseddon/putin-says-he-has-gay-friends-but-equates-gay-people-to-pedo (Putin argued that,
because fourteen states have anti-sodomy laws, Russia has a more liberal stance towards
homosexuality than the United States does).
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under Lawrence v. Texas,11 adultery and fornication laws persist.
Almost twenty states currently have statutes criminalizing adultery,
fornication, or both.12 Most of those statutes were enacted in the 1800s
and were vigorously enforced. In fact, enforcement of adultery and
fornication statutes appears to have been commonplace until the 1940s
and 1950s, when it abruptly tapered off.13 Since then, adultery has
become a civil, rather than a criminal, matter in most jurisdictions; as
such, criminal prosecutions for adultery have been largely replaced by
divorce proceedings.14 Fornication laws have not found a civil
counterpart, and consensual premarital sex between adults has all but
disappeared from the legal landscape.
A few states have recently repealed their adultery or fornication
statutes.15 On the other hand, several state legislatures have considered
and then refused to repeal their existing adultery or fornication statutes,

11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Since Lawrence, two courts have heard challenges to existing
sodomy and fornication laws, and both courts struck those laws (or the relevant portions thereof)
down pursuant to Lawrence v. Texas. La. Electorate of Gays & Lesbians, Inc. v. Connick, 902
So. 2d 1090, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding trial court’s decision to strike portion of
Louisiana criminal law that criminalized sodomy between consenting adults under Lawrence);
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005) (striking down Virginia’s fornication statute
under Lawrence). But see Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 772 (10th Cir. 2008)
(upholding police department’s reprimand of officer for off-duty sexual encounter with another
officer under rational basis test articulated in Lawrence); In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C.
2007) (refusing to extend Lawrence to sodomy case involving two minors).
12. Adultery statutes: ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1408 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-619 (West 1981); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (1972); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-35
(West Supp. 2014) (previously 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 1993)); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5511 (Supp. 2013) (previously KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2007)); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.29–.30
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9729-1 (2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-20-09 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 871–872 (2002 & Supp. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1615-60 (2003 & Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-365 (2009 & Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2005).Fornication statutes:
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (1947 & 1949); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-40 (West Supp. 2014)
(previously 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (West 1993))); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 272, § 18
(LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (LexisNexis 2012).
13. Because trial court level prosecutions are not available for this Article, appellate level
cases will be used as a proxy for how often these prosecutions were brought.
14. See HEATHER BROOK, CONJUGAL RITES: MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE-LIKE
RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE LAW 81 (2007).
15. For example, Colorado repealed its adultery statute and New Hampshire looks to follow
suit this year. See Jolie Lee, New Hampshire Senate Votes to Repeal Anti-Adultery Law, USA
TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/04/17/
anti-adultery-laws-new-hampshire/7780563/.
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indicating that the public may support criminalization of these acts.16
Despite these conflicting results, it is clear that even if states are
unwilling to repeal these statutes, public opinion has changed.17 Lack
of public interest in adultery and fornication prosecutions has led to
fewer prosecutions, as the police and prosecutors have turned their
attention to crimes that are considered to be more important.18
Changing policies have also caused adultery and fornication laws to
come into conflict with constitutional rights, such as the right to
privacy,19 as the public has come to see consensual sexual behavior
between adults as beyond the remit of the State.
The history of adultery and fornication laws can show us why these
laws were enacted and why they are no longer enforced. Adultery and
fornication laws were originally cornerstones of a legal system that
emphasized religious morality,20 so the decreasing enforcement of these
laws indicates a fundamental shift in society’s values and culture. The
change in culture can be observed in multiple ways: directly through
increasing liberalism in the United States over time, and indirectly
through the ways courts apply adultery and fornication laws. Court
cases indicate that evidentiary issues, less zealous courts and juries, and,
most recently, privacy issues have contributed to lower rates of adultery
and fornication prosecutions.
To fully investigate the interplay of culture and adultery and
fornication criminal statutes, in Part I, this Article examines the genesis
of these laws, why they were created, and how they were used. In Part
II, this Article looks at the change in culture, enforcement, and
constitutionality of these laws over time. In Part III, this Article
analyzes the evolution of evidentiary requirements surrounding these
laws and how these changes further evidence a change in American
culture and values. Finally, in Part IV, this Article examines why these
criminal laws persist in some states, and how they can still be used to
prosecute people.

16. See CARPENTER, supra note 6; see also Gabrielle Viator, The Validity of Criminal
Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837, 842–43 (2006).
17. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J.
FAM. L. 45, 55 (1991) (discussing the prevalence of marital infidelity, finding that most people
surveyed believed it should not be criminalized).
18. See, e.g., Vitali, supra note 10 (criticizing Baton Rouge police, who allocated nine sheriffs
to an anti-sodomy sting operation despite high levels of violent crime in Baton Rouge).
19. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005) (striking down Virginia’s fornication
statute under right to privacy grounds).
20. See Douglas Greenberg, Crime, Law Enforcement, and Social Control in Colonial
America, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 293, 297 (1982).
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I. THE HISTORY OF ADULTERY AND FORNICATION LAWS
Adultery and fornication criminal laws had an uneasy transition to the
Colonies from the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, adultery
and fornication were ecclesiastical crimes that were punishable only by
the Church and were therefore not part of the common law.21 Only
“open and notorious” fornication was considered a secular crime,
because it was a public nuisance.22 After the Restoration, most sexual
laws were repealed in England but remained in the Colonies.23
The Colonies disapproved of ecclesiastical courts and decided to use
secular laws and courts to enforce morals.24 More specifically, in order
to be legally prosecuted for adultery and fornication in what was to
become the United States, these crimes had to be criminalized pursuant
to statutes.25 Statutory enactments varied widely, and some did not
even define the act of fornication or adultery.26 The fact that those
statutes often did not define the crimes was of no moment to courts,
which were more than willing to use extraneous sources to supply those
definitions.27 Some early courts also did not hew to traditional
jurisprudence models at trial; judges in these courts were more
inquisitorial and used the bible as their only legal source.28 New Haven
was particularly harsh, where judges would sometimes terrorize the
accused into confessing his or her sexual transgressions.29
In the Colonies, particularly New England, colonists equated crime

21. See State ex rel. Van Nice v. Whealey, 59 N.W. 211, 212 (S.D. 1894) (“It was regarded as
an offense so essentially wicked, so subversive of private and public morality, and so opposed to
the precepts and practice of religion, that its punishment was left to the ecclesiastical
courts . . . .”); see also Carotti v. State, 42 Miss. 334, 346 (Miss. Ct. Err. & App. 1868); Morris
Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 218
(1960); Siegel, supra note 17, at 47.
22. See Richard Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual Privacy, 17
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 226, 227 (1988); Siegel, supra note 17, at 47.
23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 61 (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
24. See David H. Flaherty, Law and Enforcement of Morals in Early America, in AMERICAN
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 58 (Lawrence M. Friedman
& Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988); Ploscowe, supra note 21, at 218.
25. See Carotti, 42 Miss. at 346; Traci Shallbetter Stratton, Comment, No More Messing
Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH.
L. REV. 767, 769 (1998).
26. See State v. Pierpont, 52 P. 992, 993 (Utah 1898); see also State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn.
335, 340 (1860).
27. Armstrong, 4 Minn. at 340 (using secondary sources to define “adultery”); State v. Byrum,
83 N.W. 207, 208 (Neb. 1900) (using divorce case law to define adultery); Pierpont, 52 P. at 993
(noting that the meaning of fornication “is well understood and settled in legal parlance”).
28. Greenberg, supra note 20, at 298.
29. Id.
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with sin, and courts were seen as guardians of Biblical precepts.30
Colonial criminal codes even cited relevant Bible passages.31 To that
end, early fornication laws were concerned with curbing immorality,32
and colonial leaders encouraged cooperation between courts and
churches to monitor sexual offenses.33 Colonial judges saw themselves
as arbiters of religion and morality, not just the law.34 They often urged
those convicted to seek redemption and mend their ways.35 Those who
failed to show due humility and repentance were often punished more
severely than those who showed contrition.36 In addition, the judge’s
own morality was frequently on display in adultery and fornication
cases: “What act can be more grossly lewd or lascivious than for a man
and woman, not married to each other, to be publicly living together,
and cohabiting with each other?”37
Indeed, judges in colonial times often created a public shaming
aspect to their legal punishments, which was intended to stimulate
remorse so the transgressors could then return to the church.38
This public shaming was also intended to deter others.39 For this
reason, those convicted of sexual offenses could experience a kind of
“double jeopardy”: criminal punishment in the courts and “spiritual
sanctions” in the church.40 Moreover, secular convictions carried
severe penalties, such as substantial fines or public whippings.41
Branding and imprisonment were also common.42 Relying on scripture,

30. Flaherty, supra note 24, at 53; Greenberg, supra note 20, at 297.
31. DOCUMENTING INTIMATE MATTERS: PRIMARY SOURCES FOR A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY
IN AMERICA 7 (Thomas A. Foster ed., 2013) (citing the Ten Commandments in adultery statute).
32. Green, supra note 22, at 227.
33. KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS:
GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 91–92 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1996).
34. RICHARD GODBEER, SEXUAL REVOLUTION IN EARLY AMERICA 86 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 2002).
35. Id. at 99.
36. Id.
37. See State v. Bess, 20 Mo. 419, 421 (1855); see also State v. Hazen, 39 Iowa 648, 650
(1874) (“The evidence shows that the defendant kept up a long continued adulterous intercourse
with his wife’s twin sisters, sixteen years of age. The writer hereof cannot suppress the feeling
that the punishment inflicted is much too light, and can only regret that the provisions of the
statute did not enable the court to punish the offense in a manner proportioned to its magnitude.”).
38. See generally GODBEER, supra note 34. Members of the community also took to shaming
those who engaged in illicit sex, particularly adulterers. Id. at 245.
39. Id. at 35.
40. BROWN, supra note 33, at 189; Greenberg, supra note 20, at 297.
41. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 101; KIRSTEN FISCHER, SUSPECT RELATIONS: SEX, RACE,
AND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA 112 (Cornell Univ. Press 2002); CLAUDIA
DURST JOHNSON, DAILY LIFE IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 116–17 (2002).
42. BERNARD I. MURSTEIN, LOVE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE THROUGH THE AGES 318 (1974).
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some sex crimes, such as rape and adultery, could carry the death
penalty.43
Despite the threat of harsh criminal sanctions, colonial premarital and
extramarital sex seems to have been fairly common.44 In fact,
fornication charges were the most frequent charges brought against
women in New England in the 1600s.45 Historical records show that in
New Haven,46 Plymouth,47 and Massachusetts,48 sexual offenses
outnumbered all other categories of criminal practices in the county
court.49 In fact, “more than 150 couples living in Essex County were
convicted of premarital sex between 1640 and 1685.”50 These couples
were prosecuted even if they later married.51
Colonies outside of puritanical New England also had high rates of
morality prosecutions. For example, sexual offenses were the most
common criminal charges in Virginia.52 There is also evidence that
fornication and adultery charges became more common throughout the
Colonies as the seventeenth century progressed.53 Even in North
Carolina in the 1700s, which reportedly had a more lax judicial system,
one in ten crimes concerned immoral behavior, with adultery and
fornication as the most common offenses.54
Because both churches and magistrates took it upon themselves to
watch over the community, illicit sexual liaisons were much more likely
to be discovered, which in turn caused higher rates of prosecutions.55
Public confessions of illicit sexual behavior as late as the 1760s and
1770s were quite common in some parts of New England.56 In

43. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 35.
44. Flaherty, supra note 24, at 59–60.
45. Else L. Hambleton, The Regulation of Sex in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts: The
Quarterly Court of Essex County vs. Priscilla Willson and Mr. Samuel Appleton, in SEX AND
SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA 89, 97 (Merril D. Smith ed., 1998).
46. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 20–21.
47. Greenberg, supra note 20, at 299–300.
48. Id. at 297.
49. The Dutch colony of New Netherland (and later the English colony of New York) was
likewise concerned with sexual misconduct, but the legal institutions there lacked the necessary
authority over its more heterogeneous population to reach the prosecution levels of other New
England colonies. Greenberg, supra note 20, at 300–01. In contrast, the colonies of
Pennsylvania and West Jersey did not appear to focus on crimes of sexual misconduct. Id.
50. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 34.
51. Id.
52. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 113.
53. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 113; Hambleton, supra note 45, at 98.
54. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 112–13.
55. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 20–21; FISCHER, supra note 41, at 50.
56. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 319.
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addition, during colonial times, fornication or adultery charges may
have been the only ones available in cases of rape where the woman
became pregnant, because it was believed at the time that a woman
could conceive only if she consented to the sexual intercourse.57
Fornication and adultery charges therefore may have been used more
often in order to prosecute much graver offenses. There is also
evidence that in colonies with more property or violent crimes, morality
offenses were seldom prosecuted, which indicates that sex-based
prosecutions were a luxury that only communities with little other crime
could afford.58 Indeed, as violent and property crimes increased in the
1700s, some colonies’ prosecutions of all sexual misconduct decreased
sharply.59
Early on, for those who engaged in fornication, going to “confess”
before a magistrate instead of the entire church congregation was an
attractive option.60 Over time, however, the public nature of church
inquiries into illicit sex lessened—churches became more willing to
allow their members to confess privately and avoid scandal.61
Accordingly, after the 1740s, prosecutions for simple premarital sex
became more rare, and were dealt with as religious matters more
often.62 Even in Massachusetts, criminal prosecutions for illicit sex
decreased.63
As a result of the Social Purity Movement, there were some revivals
of sex laws in the 1800s, particularly regarding prostitution,64 the age of
consent,65 pornography,66 and birth control.67 In fact, in the 1880s,
according to the leaders of the Social Purity Movement, “the loss of

57. Hambleton, supra note 45, at 96–97.
58. Greenberg, supra note 20, at 302, 304, 308, 315.
59. Id.
60. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 236.
61. Id.
62. Id. People who engaged in illicit sex were still subject to questioning, sometimes in front
of the congregation. Id.
63. Greenberg, supra note 20, at 305.
64. POSNER, supra note 23, at 261–62; Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 2 SEXUALITIES: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 188,
189 (Ken Plummer ed., 2002). The demand for prostitution apparently increased during the
Victorian era as a result of Victorian notions of the purity of the wife (including other men’s
wives) and the ready market of prostitutes due to poor working conditions for women.
MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 273.
65. Kay L. Levine, The External Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039,
1060 (2008).
66. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187,
201 (1988).
67. Id.
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sexual purity was the worst thing that could happen to an unmarried
woman . . . .”68 Despite these aberrations, prosecutions of illicit sexual
activities generally continued to decrease following the Civil War, and
particularly after World War I, as attitudes towards sex changed.69
II. HOW CHANGES IN CULTURE LED TO CHANGES IN
ADULTERY AND FORNICATION PROSECUTIONS
A significant reason for the decrease in prosecutions for adultery and
fornication is that American society’s values and culture became more
liberal and sexually permissive over time. The reasons for prosecuting
perceived victims of these crimes were also changed, which eventually
led to even fewer prosecutions. As shown below, in the Colonies,
particularly in New England, strict religion and morality required that
all illicit sex be prosecuted. Over time, however, what constituted illicit
sex became more restricted in many states, and the reasons for
prosecuting changed. Finally, modern views on sexual relationships
have led to widespread disapproval of criminalizing pre- and extramarital sex.
A. Colonial Communities and Religion
Illicit sex was a major concern to the Colonies. Colonial leaders
were worried that adultery, and illegitimate children in particular, would
create social disorder in their communities.70 Indeed, Colonies wanted
their inhabitants to marry and have children, particularly because
indigenous natives outnumbered colonial populations.71 Those who
failed to marry were viewed with suspicion by their communities and
could even be subjected to increased taxes.72
Although increasing the population was important to the Colonies,
they still wanted sexual relationships to be based on communitysanctioned marriages. Some Colonies attempted to place stricter
restrictions on obtaining marriage licenses, such as by requiring couples
to obtain a license from a government official.73 However, practical

68. Levine, supra note 65, at 1060.
69. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 320, 419, 429, 435; MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN
AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 233, 306, 330 (3d ed. 1983).
70. See FISCHER, supra note 41, at 113 (adultery); BROWN, supra note 33, at 28 (illegitimate
children).
71. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 299.
72. Id. There may also have been an economic motive to encouraging men to marry—having
a family made them less likely to travel or return to England once they had earned enough wages.
BROWN, supra note 33, at 80.
73. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 40.
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difficulties in obtaining official marriage licenses in the relatively
unpopulated Colonies had a large impact on the sexual and marital
practices of their inhabitants. For example, colonists frequently had
casual relationships because of a lack of ministers in the Colonies.74
These colonists would cohabitate, part, and seek new partners
elsewhere.75 Bigamy was also easier to practice because of the ease of
travel and delays in communication between colonies.76
Other colonial practices show variations from traditional marriage.
For example, in the 1700s, to accommodate young peoples’ desire to get
to know each other before getting married, elders would allow young
people to engage in the practice of “bundling,” or sleeping together in
the same bed while being physically separated by a plank of wood or
special clothing that was sewn shut over intimate body parts.77 In
addition, some couples engaged in “spiritual marriage” whereby they
had a “spiritual” relationship with a member of the opposite sex and
even lived with them, but did not have a physical marriage.78 These
spiritual marriages were looked upon with skepticism by some, and
perhaps rightly so, as some resulted in illegitimate children.79
Similarly, as premarital sex increased during the 1700s, the issue of
how to deal with illegitimate children and fornication changed in
colonial communities.80 During the 1700s, courts increasingly focused
on adultery and fornication, particularly that which resulted in
illegitimate children.81 Premarital sex was often discovered upon the
birth of a child—either to an unwed woman or to a woman who was
wed too close to the child’s birth.82 More specifically, in late 1600s
Massachusetts, people were prosecuted for fornication if they had
children out of wedlock or eight months or less after marriage.83 Later

74. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 8; FISCHER, supra note 41, at 19.
75. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 8.
76. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 19. Similarly, records were hard to acquire, particularly
between different colonies (later, states or territories) so some courts placed the burden on
defendants to prove that they were married to each other. See, e.g., State v. McDuffie, 12 S.E. 83
84–85 (N.C. 1890).
77. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 317.
78. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 243.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 230.
81. Id.; POSNER, supra note 23, at 61; see also Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse:
Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 48 (1991–1992) (noting that in one
Massachusetts county 210 of the 370 criminal convictions from 1760 to 1774 were for the crime
of fornication).
82. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 34.
83. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 319; Hambleton, supra note 45, at 89. In the New England
colonies, churches recorded births that took place within eight months of marriage. RYAN, supra
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on, courts were increasingly concerned with identifying the fathers of
illegitimate children to force these men to pay for their offspring so that
county taxes would not be used for the child’s care.84 Some colonies
had a custom whereby they attempted to coerce women to identify the
father of their children while they were in labor, and the confession was
considered strong evidence in determining paternity.85 Moreover, in
North Carolina, a 1741 law allowed women to declare in court whom
the father of their illegitimate child was, and that man became the legal
father with no other evidence required.86
Early illicit sex laws in the Colonies and England also show a
disparity of treatment between the sexes. In the Colonies, only a
married woman could be guilty of adultery—married men who had sex
with unmarried women were guilty only of fornication, which carried a
lesser penalty.87 Blackstone likewise defined adultery as intercourse
with a married woman, which meant that a married man could commit
adultery only with a woman who was married to someone else.88
Similarly, in colonial times, if a wife wanted a divorce, she had to show
that her husband lived in adultery, whereas a husband had to show only
that his wife had committed a single act of adultery.89 In some states,
this differential treatment persisted into the 1950s.90
These disparate rules were based, at least in part, on concerns of
paternity.91 In England, for example, the monogamy of one’s wife was
essential to ensure that all offspring that could inherit were legitimate,
as well as to maintain the husband’s pride and honor.92 Courts were
likewise concerned with preventing the introduction of “spurious heirs
into a family, whereby a man may be charged with the maintenance of
children not his own, and the legitimate offspring be robbed of their
lawful inheritance.”93 This fear of illegitimate offspring was also why
note 69, at 42.
84. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 103; Flaherty, supra note 24, at 53, 62.
85. RYAN, supra note 69, at 43.
86. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 103. Connecticut had a different solution to illegitimate
children: in 1650, fornicators were required to marry each other. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at
320.
87. DURST, supra note 41, at 117; Flaherty, supra note 24, at 53, 55. This disparity is also
present in earlier Hebraic laws. Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery: A Synopsis, 1 J.
FAM. L. 89, 94 (1961).
88. BROOK, supra note 14, at 83 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 85.
92. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 17.
93. State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, 340–41 (1860); see also State v. Keith, 92 P. 893, 894
(Wash. 1907); State v. Roberts, 173 N.W. 310, 311 (Wis. 1919). Compensating a husband for the
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some states made only adultery by a married woman a crime: “That an
offence which may entail such consequences upon society, is much
more aggravated in its nature, than the simple incontinence of a
husband, few can doubt; although, in a moral point of view, the sin is
equally heinous.”94 For that reason, some states considered fornication
to be a lesser offense than adultery95 due to the greater injuries caused
by adultery for families and society.96
Early court records also show that women were much more likely to
be convicted of fornication, which may have been due to the premium
placed on the virtue of chastity for women.97 For example, women who
had a child out of wedlock were punished more severely than their
partners, even though both were guilty of fornication.98 Similarly, an
adulterous wife was considered especially wrongful not only because
she could potentially create spurious heirs, but also because she brought
shame upon her husband, who was then perceived as failing to maintain
his natural dominance.99 Indeed, keeping watch over and controlling
the sexual activities of one’s wife was a central theme in sermons and
advice manuals in England and America.100
Despite these general trends, fornication and adultery laws differed
from colony to colony (and later, state to state). These variations show
different purposes for these crimes and different conceptions of the
harms of these crimes to individuals and communities. By looking at
these cases, these trends become more pronounced.
B. Stricter Laws: Habitual Intercourse, Cohabitation,
and “Open and Notorious”
In contrast to the colonial era, beginning in the mid-1800s, adultery
and fornication were not always presumed to be of harm or interest to
the entire community. For that reason, although some adultery and

potential introduction of spurious heirs was also the basis for alienation of affection or
“heartbalm” torts. Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 407 (2008); see
also Doe v. Roe, 20 A. 83, 84 (Me. 1890); Kroessin v. Keller, 62 N.W. 438, 438 (Minn. 1895).
94. Armstrong, 4 Minn. at 341; see also Commonwealth v. Call, 38 Mass. 509, 511 (1839);
Keith, 92 P. at 894; Roberts, 173 N.W. at 311.
95. Easley v. Commonwealth, 11 A. 220, 221 (Pa. 1887).
96. Armstrong, 4 Minn. at 337 (1860).
97. Id.; BROWN, supra note 33, at 31; see also MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 312 (discussing
that purity in women was emphasized to the extent that women were advised to guard their purity
by not even sitting too close to a man). Indeed, historically, women were portrayed as inherently
lusty and unpredictable. BROWN, supra note 33, at 19.
98. RYAN, supra note 69, at 43.
99. BROWN, supra note 33, at 29.
100. FISCHER, supra note 41, at 17.
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fornication statutes required only a single act of sex, other statutes
required habitual intercourse or cohabitation, which was presumed to
harm society in general.101 Habitual intercourse meant repeated acts of
sex, not simply living together.102 For example, “[t]he mere stopping
over one night at a house upon a transitory journey, and assuming the
marital relationship, for purposes of illicit sexual commerce, however
scandalous and disgraceful from a moral standpoint” was not
sufficient.103 Similarly, evidence of sexual intercourse—visiting one
another and even fathering an illegitimate child—was not considered
habitual intercourse.104
Cohabitation, on the other hand, required habitual intercourse in
addition to the requirement that “the parties must dwell together, openly
and notoriously, upon terms as if the conjugal relation existed between
them.”105 In short, the parties had to live together while having
repeated sexual intercourse.106 It was this “open and notorious” quality
of cohabitation that offended society at large.107
Cohabitation
indictments included language that the cohabitation was “against the

101. Indeed, some states had multiple versions of fornication—one while living together and
one while not. Jones v. State, 16 S.W. 189, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891).
102. Smith v. State, 39 Ala. 554, 555 (1865); State v. Johnson, 69 Ind. 85, 87–88 (1879); see
also Quartemas v. State, 48 Ala. 269, 271 (1872) (“The parties accused must live together in
adultery or fornication, or at least the conduct of the parties must be of such a character as to
become, openly, an evil example—an outrage upon decency and morality.”); Lawson v. State, 33
So. 2d 388, 389 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948); Wilson v. State, 39 So. 2d 250, 253 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948);
Janssen v. People, 131 Ill. App. 73, 75 (1907); Jackson v. State, 19 N.E. 330 (Ind. 1889); State v.
Kleiman, 85 S.E.2d 148, 151 (N.C. 1954).
103. Turney v. State, 29 S.W. 893, 894 (Ark. 1895); see also People v. King, 146 P. 51, 51
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1914) (concluding that because parties occupied different rooms of the same
hotel, there was not enough for a conviction, even though they were caught in compromising
position).
104. Ledbetter v. State, 17 S.W. 427, 428 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886); see, e.g., Stewart v. State, 46
So. 2d 245, 246–47 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950); Richey v. State, 87 N.E. 1032, 1033 (Ind. 1909);
Jackson, 19 N.E. at 330; Commonwealth. v. Calef, 10 Mass. 153, 153 (1813); State v. Gieseke,
147 N.W. 663, 666 (Minn. 1914); State v. Williams, 102 N.W. 722, 722–23 (Minn. 1905);
Granberry v. State, 61 Miss. 440, 441 (1884); Gill v. State, 240 P. 1073, 1075 (Okla. Crim. App.
1925); Burnett v. State, 70 S.W. 207, 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1902) (concluding parties did not
cohabitate even though they were often seen in town together or visiting each other’s houses, seen
working together, and caught once together in a state of partial undress); Bird v. State, 11 S.W.
641, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889).
105. Carotti v. State, 42 Miss. 334, 345 (1868); Harris v. State, 145 P. 759, 760 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1915); see also People v. Stern, 207 Ill. App. 154 (1917); State v. Robinson, 176 S.E.2d
253, 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970); Commonwealth. v. Isaacs, 26 Va. 634, 635 (1826) (explaining,
but not directly quoting, that parties must dwell together open and notoriously in order to be
considered cohabitating).
106. State v. Chandler, 96 Ind. 591, 593 (1884).
107. Gill, 240 P. at 1075.
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peace” and an “evil example to others.”108
Some statutes simply required this cohabitation, without pretension to
being lawfully married.109 So long as the parties lived together while
having sexual intercourse, they were unlawfully cohabitating as man
and wife.110 Indeed, in some states, living together for an ostensibly
proper purpose while clandestinely engaging in multiple acts of
intercourse would be sufficient.111 For example, the California
legislature removed the words “open and notorious” from its
cohabitation statute, which expanded the statute to apply “to those
persons who, while each was simulating continence in their marital
relations, were at the same time maintaining such a course of illicit and
adulterous conduct with another of the opposite sex as would constitute
a counterfeit of the marriage relation.”112 In contrast, if the parties lived
together “apparently chaste, regularly occupying separate apartments, a
single instance of illicit intercourse surely would not constitute the
crime of living together in an open state of fornication.”113
In contrast, public knowledge of illicit sex was key in some states. If
the parties falsely told others that they were married to each other, their
crime was not open and notorious, because the fact that they were
committing adultery or fornication was kept secret.114 In order to be
open and notorious, at least one person had to know that the relationship
was not a valid marriage.115 Keeping the true status of their relationship
a secret, then, prevented that crime from being “an affront to
society.”116
108. Calef, 10 Mass. at 153. Further, because society was the victim of cohabitating couples,
cohabitation charges did not have to be brought by an injured spouse. Gill, 240 P. at 1075.
109. One court concluded:
We think the legislature intended by section 208 and 209 of the Criminal Code to
make it unlawful for persons not joined together in wedlock to live in a state of
adultery or fornication, either secretly or openly, and whether they profess to live in
the marital state or not. If they cohabit,—if they live after the fashion of husband and
wife,—they are within the letter of the statute, and likewise, it seems to us, within its
spirit.
Sweenie v. State, 80 N.W. 815, 816 (Neb. 1899).
110. Granberry v. State, 61 Miss. 440, 441 (1884).
111. State v. Gieseke, 147 N.W. 663, 666 (Minn. 1914).
112. People v. Scarpa, 163 P. 882, 883 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1916).
113. Searls v. People, 13 Ill. 597, 598 (1852); see also State v. Ramage, 84 S.E. 246, 247 (W.
Va. 1915).
114. E.g. Crouse v. State, 16 Ark. 566, 567–68 (1855); People v. Salmon, 83 P. 42, 42–43
(Cal. 1905); People v. Breeding, 126 P. 179, 180–81 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912); Richey v. State,
87 N.E. 1032, 1033 (Ind. 1909). But see Ex parte Thomas, 37 P. 514 (Cal. 1894) (requiring
“notorious” cohabitation).
115. Gill v. State, 240 P. 1073, 1075 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925).
116. Salmon, 83 P. at 43.
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On the other hand, pretend marriages, according to some courts,
created “indecent and evil examples tending to debase and demoralize
society.”117 For that reason, once a couple’s true relationship status was
discovered, their illicit sex became “open and notorious,” even if the
community previously believed that the couple was married.118
According to one court:
When such a relationship has been made to appear the public scandal
and disgrace is just as great and the notoriety is just as prevalent as
had it been known during the entire time. The notoriety of such a
continuous living together and the thought that good people had been
deceived into receiving such parties into their homes and treating them
with the respect and consideration due to lawfully married people is
humiliating in the extreme.119

Consequently, to be convicted of fornication or adultery, the parties did
not have to admit that their relationship was illegal; they only had to be
discovered.120
By the 1940s, the cohabitation requirements became relaxed in some
states. These states did not require that the parties actually live
together; there simply had to be an agreement that the parties would
continue having illicit intercourse.121 Additionally, the timeframe for
cohabitating could be very short—in one case, two weeks was sufficient
to make the relationship “habitual.”122 These changes in fornication
and adultery laws indicate a willingness to capture habitual illicit sex
without any concern for “sham” marriages that offend the community.
Accordingly, the focus of fornication and adultery laws in later cases
indicates that what was considered offensive to society changed over
time.
C. Rationale for Adultery Prosecutions
The question of who is the victim—society or the innocent spouse—
is manifested frequently in adultery cases. In colonial times, adultery
was considered a crime against society’s morals.123 By the 1800s,

117. Richey, 87 N.E. at 1033; see also Janssen v. People, 131 Ill. App. 73, 75 (1907) (noting
that open and notorious cohabitation “outrages public decency”); Harris v. State, 145 P. 759, 760
(Okla. Crim. App. 1915) (same).
118. Spencer v. State, 169 P. 270, 272 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Burgett v. State, 70 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954); Lawson v. State, 33 So. 2d
388, 389 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948).
122. State v. Kleiman, 85 S.E.2d 148, 151 (N.C. 1954).
123. Jeremy D. Weinstein, Adultery, Law and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195,
225–26 (1986).
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however, judges usually considered adultery to be a crime of one spouse
against another.124 These judges considered adultery to be injurious to
the innocent spouse, even if that spouse later divorced his or her
adulterous partner.125 The notion that adultery was a crime of one
spouse against another also led some states to create an exception to the
spousal privilege so that an injured spouse could testify against his or
her wrongdoer.126
In fact, several states required an injured spouse to bring the action or
else there could be no prosecution.127 The reasoning behind this
requirement was to protect spouses who did not want to publicize the
infidelity.128 For example, a Minnesota court held that “if the parties
injured choose to acquiesce in the wrong done, no one else ought to be
allowed to move in the matter . . . .”129 A North Dakota court stated the
policy even more eloquently:
Laws of this character are evidently enacted for the purpose of
protecting the sanctity of the home, and in recognition of the principle
that the crime of adultery is a crime peculiarly infringing upon the
rights of the innocent parties to the marriage relation, and that if such
innocent parties see fit to condone the offense, and from a desire to
avoid scandal and humiliation, and to preserve the integrity of the
home, and prevent the disgrace of children and relatives, refuse to
prosecute, the public is not sufficiently interested or injured to justify

124. See, e.g., Lord v. State, 23 N.W. 507, 509 (Neb. 1885) (“The statute makes it an offense
for a husband to desert his wife and live and cohabit with another woman. If the husband is
prosecuted for the offense, the prosecution certainly would be a criminal proceeding for a crime
committed against the wife.”); Taylor v. State, 232 P. 963, 963–64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925) (“A
charge of adultery never ceases to be a matter of private concern.”); Roland v. State, 9 Tex. App.
277, 277 (1880) (“That it is an offence against the husband for the wife to live in adultery with
another man, will hardly admit of question.”).
125. State v. Smith, 79 N.W. 115, 116 (Iowa 1899).
126. State v. Vollander, 58 N.W. 878, 878–79 (Minn. 1894); Lord, 23 N.W. at 509; Kitchens
v. State, 140 P. 619, 622 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914).
127. State v. Oden, 69 N.W. 270, 271 (Iowa 1896); State v. Mahan, 46 N.W. 855, 855–56
(Iowa 1890); People v. Davis, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (Mich. 1884); Bayliss v. People, 9 N.W. 257,
257 (Mich. 1881); State v. Marshall, 168 N.W. 174, 174 (Minn. 1918); In re Smith, 37 P. 1099,
1100 (Okla. 1894) (holding divorced spouse cannot bring prosecution); Ex parte Cranford, 105 P.
367, 369 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909); State v. Eggleston, 77 P. 738, 739 (Or. 1904). However,
despite the requirement that a spouse bring the cause of action, at least one state court held that
adultery is not a “crime” of one spouse against the other and involves “no violence to, or abuse
of” the innocent spouse. State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, 338, 343 (1860); see also
Commonwealth v. McGanghan, 29 Pa. C.C. 361, 362 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1904) (“The crime of
adultery is not a crime by the husband against the wife or vice versa, but a crime against the
marital relation.”).
128. State v. Andrews, 64 N.W. 404, 405 (Iowa 1895); State v. La Bounty, 116 P. 1073, 1073
(Wash. 1911).
129. State v. Brecht, 42 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1889).
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the institution of criminal proceedings, as in other cases, by any
member of the community.130

Courts were clearly concerned not only with the injury of the adultery
itself, but with the further injury a public criminal prosecution could
wreak on the innocent spouse:
The law does not say that we may depart from the spirit of the law,
and hold a forgiving spouse to a prosecution that must, from the very
fact of the publishing of the details of the crime in open court, tend
most strongly to a final disruption of the home; and most certainly to
the shame of innocent children, if there be any children. If the law
does not say that a case must be continued, why should we? And to
what end must it proceed—that a prosecutor may dangle a scalp at his
belt; that the public may feed upon the blood that flows from broken
hearts; that an offense that is personal may, by a killing of the spirit of
the law, become a written monument to blazon those errors that come
of the frailties and weaknesses that our Mother Nature has burdened
her children with? If the injured one is willing to forgive and forget,
the law—there being no public interest in the crime charged—should
not be less merciful. A charge may be forgotten, but the hurts and
wounds that follow a public trial are rarely healed.131

Because courts were so sensitive to the humiliation attendant to an
adultery prosecution, they were concerned that allowing a complaining
witness to dismiss a case at his or her pleasure at any point in the
proceedings would allow him or her to blackmail the accused.132 The
existence of several cases where adultery and fornication statutes were
used to blackmail someone indicates the threat of blackmail was very
real.133 For example, in one case, an adultery prosecution was made in
retaliation against a defendant and her two sons for having testified
against one of the state’s witnesses in a prior prosecution against that
witness.134
Courts’ concern for victims led to evidentiary problems with which
states attempted to grapple, usually by relaxing the requirement that the
injured spouse bring the complaint or extending the crime to include
other injured parties.135 More specifically, one problem courts dealt
130. State v. Wesie, 118 N.W. 20, 21 (N.D. 1908).
131. Taylor v. State, 232 P. 963, 964 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925) (internal citations omitted); see
also La Bounty, 116 P. at 1073 (noting the embarrassment of a public prosecution).
132. Perry v. State, 181 P.2d 280, 286 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947); State v. Astin, 180 P. 394,
394 (Wash. 1919).
133. Weinstein, supra note 123, at 226. Related tort causes of action (such as seduction or
breach of promise) were also fertile ground for blackmail. ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL
BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY 95–96 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
134. Cook v. State, 85 So. 823, 824 (Ala. Ct. App. 1920).
135. See, e.g., State v. Maas, 49 N.W. 1037, 1038 (Iowa 1891); State v. Mahan, 46 N.W. 855,
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with was that adultery prosecutions had to be dropped if the injured
spouse withdrew his or her complaint after reconciling with the
adulterous spouse. One way courts dealt with this situation was to
allow a prosecution to continue once an injured spouse had made the
complaint even if the injured spouse no longer wished to pursue it.136
These courts usually downplayed the importance of the spousal
complaint requirement as being merely procedural.137
Courts also sometimes extended a statute to allow an injured husband
to sue the offending spouse or her paramour for adultery.138 One
Pennsylvania court reasoned:
[I]f the injured husband is denied capacity to criminally prosecute his
wife’s paramour, the only result is that an obstacle is placed in the way
of the punishment of crime without any corresponding public
advantage, since, as we have already said, he is free to bring a civil
action, in which his wife’s shame and guilt, as well as the shame and
guilt of her paramour, may be fully exposed, and by reason of which
his wife may be laid open to criminal prosecution.139

Allowing an injured spouse to sue not only his or her own spouse but
also his or her (perhaps unmarried) paramour was also justified by a
North Dakota court in terms of injury not only to the innocent spouse,
but also to society at large:
It is certainly a monstrous anomaly that the feelings of society should
be outraged, and a whole community injured, by the undisputed
commission of this offense continued for months and years, and that,

855–56 (Iowa 1890); State v. Briggs, 27 N.W. 358, 360 (Iowa 1886); Bayliss v. People, 9 N.W.
257, 257 (Mich. 1881); State v. Brecht, 42 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1889); State v. Hayes, 94 P.
751, 751 (Or. 1908).
136. Briggs, 27 N.W. at 359.
137. Maas, 49 N.W. at 1038 (citations omitted) (“This provision, forbidding prosecution for
the crime except on the complaint of [a spouse], does not prescribe an element of the crime. . .
evidence as to the commencement of the prosecution by the husband or wife may be introduced,
though no averment of the fact is found in the indictment.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Briggs, 27 N.W. at 360 (“The requirement is merely directory, and the endorsement is required to
be made to enable the court to tax the costs against the prosecutor, if it should be satisfied that the
prosecution was malicious or without probable cause.”); Brecht, 42 N.W. at 603 (“The statute
does not point out how the question shall be raised that the prosecution was not commenced on
the complaint of the proper person. The making of the complaint is no part of the offense.”);
Hayes, 94 P. at 751 (finding that an indictment which states that it was found on the complaint of
the wife of the defendant was sufficient to show that an indictment for adultery was commenced
upon the complaint of a person authorized by statute to commence such a prosecution); see also
State v. Donovan, 16 N.W. 130, 131 (Iowa 1883) (“While, therefore, the defendant cannot be
convicted without proof that the indictment was found on complaint of the wife, we do not think
it is incumbent upon the state to establish the fact beyond reasonable doubt.”).
138. Bayliss, 9 N.W. at 257; see also Mahan, 46 N.W. at 855–56 (Iowa 1890) (allowing
injured husband to sue wife’s paramour).
139. Commonwealth v. Vance, 29 Pa. C.C. 257, 260 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1903).
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under the law, there is no remedy so long as the husband or wife,
either from fear of his own or her own degradation, declines or refuses
to apply the remedy. But when we go one step further and say that the
wife of a guilty husband cannot complain against the wife of another
husband, but can only complain of her husband, and that such other
wife must escape punishment if her husband does not complain
against her, the outrage, to my mind, is still greater . . . .140

By the 1910s, some courts had begun to see adultery as a crime
against the marriage relation itself141 as well as the injured spouse.142
This was particularly true in situations where the injured spouse made
the initial complaint.143 Moreover, exceptions were also made for
“open and notorious” adultery, which was considered to be a crime
against society as much as against the spouse.144 This change in
perspective progressed to the point where one court noted that adultery
is a “victimless crime.”145 However, the requirement that an adultery
proceeding be instituted by the injured spouse has persisted in some
states, and, in 1970, this requirement was the basis for one court holding
that the statute does not violate the equal protection clause because the
statute “at least affords equal protection to all adulterers, and is a
safeguard against a zealous prosecutor, acting independently, from
instituting a prosecution and thereby destroying a salvageable
marriage.”146 Accordingly, due to states’ inconsistent approaches to
140. State v. Wesie, 118 N.W. 20, 21–22 (N.D. 1908).
141. State v. Chafin, 103 P. 143, 144 (Kan. 1909); State v. Brooks, 254 N.W. 374, 375 (Wis.
1934).
142. Kitchens v. State, 140 P. 619, 621 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914).
143. State v. Allison, 220 N.W. 563, 564 (Minn. 1928) (“[T]he statute makes the offense a
crime against the state, and . . . if commenced as authorized by the statute, it is thereafter solely
within the control of the court. That the offense is a crime against the state and not against the
other spouse . . . .”); State v. Beck, 202 N.W. 857, 859 (N.D. 1925) (“The court is not a plaything
with which one can play fast and loose, and the reason for the rule ceases when the complaint is
made upon which prosecution is commenced.”); Lee v. State, 231 P. 324, 325 (Okla. Crim. App.
1924) (“After a prosecution for adultery has been commenced, the offense has become at least a
quasi public offense, a prosecution which the aggrieved party may have a special interest in
maintaining, but one in which the public is also interested in some degree.”); State v. Astin, 180
P. 394, 394 (Wash. 1919) (“The case, after the complaint is filed, is no longer a matter of private
concern, but has partaken of all the attributes of a public offense, and the injured spouse should
have no more right to control the further disposition of the case than should the complaining
witness in any other criminal action.”); see also State v. Ronek, 176 N.W.2d 153, 155–56 (Iowa
1970).
144. Kitchens, 140 P. at 622 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914) (“[A]ny person may make complaint
when it is alleged that the defendants ‘are living together in open and notorious adultery,’ as such
adulterous cohabitation and its notoriety necessarily tends to debase and lower the standard of
public morals by dishonoring the marital relation.”); Heacock v. State, 112 P. 949, 950 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1911).
145. State v. Dugan, 277 S.E.2d 842, 844 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
146. Ronek, 176 N.W.2d at 156.
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identifying the victim in adultery cases, the rationale for criminalizing
adultery remained uncertain, even in more modern times.
D. Rationale for Fornication Prosecutions
In contrast to adultery, fornication has been consistently seen as an
offense against “public decency and morality”147 and detrimental to the
morals of a community.148 Early cases emphasized that fornication
upset the “peace and dignity of the state,”149 especially when it was
habitual.150 As one court said, fornication laws were intended:
[T]o prevent evil and indecent examples tending to corrupt the public
morals, and to prohibit the public scandal and disgrace of the living
together of persons of opposite sexes notoriously in illicit intimacy,
which, as it contemns [sic] lawful wedlock and lessens the incentive to
marriage, contravenes the public policy, and which outrages public
decency, and has a demoralizing and debasing influence upon
society.151

Criminalizing fornication was not meant only to prohibit the “public
scandal and disgrace of such immoral connections, but also to
[encourage marriage,] upon which the best interests, and indeed the
existence, of society depend.”152 According to at least some courts,
fornication was seen as a direct affront to marriage.153
As noted above, criminalizing fornication was also an attempt to
prevent the creation of illegitimate offspring,154 particularly because
illegitimate children were seen as a financial burden on the state.155 In
fact, in Pennsylvania, part of the criminal punishment for fornication
and bastardy was the financial maintenance of the illegitimate child.156
In colonial North America, there may have been a higher frequency of
fornication prosecutions against women because some women used the

147. Boatwright v. State, 60 S.W. 760, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901).
148. State v. Cagle, 21 Tenn. 414, 414 (1841) (“[D]esigning to corrupt the morals of the
people of the State . . . .”); State v. Brooks, 254 N.W. 374, 375 (Wis. 1934) (“[T]he law seeks . . .
to prevent a course of conduct which in public estimation constitutes an example detrimental to
the morals of the community.”).
149. State v. Tally, 74 N.C. 322, 322 (1876).
150. Crosgrove v. State, 39 S.W. 367, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897).
151. Carotti v. State, 42 Miss. 334, 345 (Miss. Err. & App. 1868).
152. Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. 187, 191–92 (1877); see GODBEER, supra note 34, at 40
(discussing a colonial court that attempted to incentivize marriage).
153. Tally, 74 N.C. at 322.
154. Sheay v. State, 21 A. 607, 608 (Md. 1891); State v. Dickinson, 18 N.C. 349, 349 (1835);
Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage
Amendments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 272 (2005).
155. Commonwealth v. Scott, 7 Pa. Super. 590, 592–93 (1898).
156. Id.
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fornication proceedings in order to obtain marriage or child support
from the child’s father.157 The woman’s confession—and subsequent
public humiliation—was used to later bring a paternity suit against the
woman’s paramour.158 If the man agreed to marry the woman or pay
child support, he could settle with her privately and then she could have
the paternity or fornication indictment dismissed.159 Over time, this
process was streamlined and paternity became a civil matter and was
uncoupled from fornication statutes.160 This trend partially explains the
decrease in fornication prosecutions over time.
E. Modern Views of Adultery and Fornication
Since the Victorian era, the incidence and approval of both premarital
and extramarital sex has steadily increased. The greater availability of
contraceptives, a more naturalistic view towards sex, greater
independence of women, greater economic opportunity, and the
growing acceptance of hedonism as a life philosophy all contributed to a
post–World War I cultural shift towards an increased emphasis on sex
both within and outside marriage.161 In the twentieth century,
premarital sex became more common as more convenient transportation
made it easier for young people to meet without being observed.162 As
dating, which included seeing multiple prospective marriage partners at
the same time, replaced courtship in the 1930s and 1940s, the incidence
of premarital sex increased even further.163 The result was a steady rise
in the rates of premarital sex, as well as more accepting attitudes
towards the practice throughout the middle of the twentieth century.164
Rates and acceptance of adultery likewise increased during this time.165
Popular opinion approving of premarital sex increased sharply in the
1960s and continued to increase in the 1970s.166 Some scholars have
157. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 256.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Judith Treas, How Cohorts, Education, and Ideology Shaped a New Sexual Revolution on
American Attitudes Toward Nonmarital Sex, 1972–1998, 45 SOC. PERSP. 267, 268–69 (2002); see
MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 560–61 (discussing how the perfecting of contraceptives, a more
naturalistic view of sex, the growing acceptability of hedonism as a philosophy of life, the rise in
women’s status, and economic prosperity brought a resurgence of sexual feeling into marriage);
RYAN, supra note at 69, 233–35.
162. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 386.
163. Id. at 386–87. The risk of ruining one’s reputation with premarital sex also decreased
during this time. Id. at 387.
164. Id. at 429.
165. Id. at 434, 544.
166. David J. Harding & Christopher Jencks, Changing Attitudes Toward Premarital Sex:
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attributed this more recent change to increased emphasis on
individuality and personal fulfillment.167 In contrast, people who are
more religious are less likely to approve of premarital sex.168
Organized religion’s influence on sexual attitudes has been explained as
lessening individuality and “fostering internalized sanctions such as
guilt.”169 Those who view adultery more positively also have a more
diffuse view of intimacy generally; they approve of sharing personal or
private feelings with people other than their spouses170 and also approve
of premarital sex.171
By 1960, a majority of states still criminally prohibited fornication
and adultery; however, perhaps because of cultural shifts, those laws
were seen as largely unobserved by the majority of the population.172
Legal scholars at this time called for these statutes’ repeal, arguing that
they were unenforceable due to the private nature of the acts
prescribed.173 Similarly, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a more
liberal attitude towards privacy rights and non-marital sex in
contraceptive cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird174 in 1972 and Carey v.
Population Services International175 in 1977. The growing awareness
of an enforceable right to privacy, as emphasized in Eisenstadt and
Carey, led to (unsuccessful) privacy challenges to adultery and
fornication statutes in the 1970s and 1980s.176
Cohort, Period, and Aging Effects, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 211, 225 (2003). But see Treas, supra
note 161, at 269 (indicating a trend of less tolerant attitudes towards premarital sex after the mid1970s).
167. Treas, supra note 161, at 268–69.
168. Jon P. Alston, Attitudes Toward Extramarital and Homosexual Relations, 13 J. SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 479, 479 (1974); Jean Dedman, The Relationship Between Religious
Attitude and Attitude Toward Premarital Sex Relations, 21 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING, 171, 175
(1959); Frank Lindenfeld, A Note on Social Mobility, Religiosity, and Students’ Attitudes
Towards Premarital Sexual Relations, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 81, 82 (1960); B. K. Singh, Trends in
Attitudes Toward Premarital Sexual Relations, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 387, 391 (1980).
169. Treas, supra note 161, at 268.
170. Janice Miller Saunders & John N. Edwards, Extramarital Sexuality: A Predictive Model
of Permissive Attitudes, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 825, 828, 832 (1984). Unsurprisingly, they also
are less satisfied with their marriages. Id. at 832.
171. Anthony P. Thompson, Extramarital Sex: A Review of the Research Literature, 19 J. SEX
RES. 1, 18–19 (1983).
172. Ploscowe, supra note 21, at 218–19.
173. Id. at 221. Others have argued that these laws should be repealed because, despite their
infrequent enforcement, they have other stigmatic effects that can still be harmful. POSNER,
supra note 23, at 80–81.
174. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
175. 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see POSNER, supra note 23, at 331–32.
176. E.g., Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983) (finding a privacy
challenge to an adultery statute unsuccessful); State v. Saunders, 326 A.2d 84 (Essex Cnty. Ct.
1974), aff’d, 361 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976), rev’d, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977)
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These changing views on sex outside of marriage have also been
borne out in the decreasing frequency of prosecutions for fornication
and adultery. The following charts aggregate data taken from cases that
were gathered using online legal databases. Only appellate cases were
available and the resulting data is meant to be illustrative and not
dispositive of the number of prosecutions for adultery and fornication,
particularly for earlier cases where records are harder to obtain online.
Even the limited data gathered, however, shows a wide variety of trends
in prosecutions. For example, as shown by Figure 1, both adultery and
fornication cases increased until they peaked between the 1890s and
1910s, and then decreased (for adultery, dramatically). By the 1980s,
prosecutions for both crimes had all but disappeared.
Figure 1—Number of Prosecutions over Time

However, despite decreasing interest in prosecuting adultery and
fornication and the relatively low punishment for a conviction, even in
the 1950s, police were willing to expend resources to apprehend
adulterers and fornicators.177 Police would even follow suspects and
stake out homes where reported adulterers or fornicators were suspected
to be engaging in illicit sex.178 Accordingly, as early as the 1950s, there
was a disparity between prosecutors’ dwindling interest in these cases

(holding a privacy challenge to fornication statute as unsuccessful); Byrd v. State, 222 N.W.2d
696 (Wis. 1974) (holding that a privacy challenge to fornication statute is to be dismissed for lack
of standing).
177. See, e.g., State v. Kleiman, 85 S.E.2d 148, 150 (N.C. 1954).
178. Id.; State v. Davenport, 33 S.E.2d 136, 137 (N.C. 1945).
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and the remaining willingness of police to arrest and juries to convict
for these crimes. This disparity mirrors the existing inconsistency
between the general public’s acceptance of adultery and fornication and
state legislatures’ unwillingness to repeal the laws criminalizing these
acts.
Gender disparities are also prevalent in fornication and adultery
prosecutions. Looking at post-colonial cases in Figures 2 and 3, the
person charged with fornication or adultery was overwhelmingly likely
to be male, and this trend stayed constant over time. With regard to
adultery, only the 1940s had more female defendants. The likelihood of
both parties being charged with adultery or fornication also appears to
increase over time, peaking in the 1910s for adultery and the 1880s for
fornication. However, because it uses solely appeals cases, this case
data is limited and may show only that men were more likely to appeal
their convictions than were women. Indeed, considering historical
property laws,179 it is entirely plausible that men were more likely to
have the resources to appeal their convictions. Actual convictions at the
trial level may show different trends.
Figure 2—Adultery Appeals by Gender of Defendant180
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Figure 3—Fornication Appeals by Gender of Defendant
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179. Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S
HIST. 9, 9–11 (1994).
180. For Figures 2 and 3, cases where the defendant’s gender was unclear have been omitted.
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F. Trends in Civil Cases
Along with diminishing adultery and fornication prosecutions, related
civil cases show a trend in the changing values placed on privacy and
sex. As shown below, judges in civil cases have repeatedly referred to
the existence of criminal adultery or fornication statutes when making
their decisions in civil cases. One such area of overlap is immigration.
For example, a man was denied citizenship in 1935 because of one
instance of adultery.181 In that case, the court assumed that adultery
was morally offensive and therefore determined that the applicant did
not meet the standards of moral behavior required to become a United
States citizen.182 Similarly, in 1944, a woman was not denied
citizenship because, although she had committed fornication, she had
believed the man was her lawful husband.183 In that case, the court
emphasized that her mistake meant that she had not “done anything
which the community regard as reprehensible.”184 However, by 1963,
fornication was not a barrier to naturalization, because it was not a
felony and not one of the statue’s listed acts, such as illegal gambling or
habitual drunkenness “which statutorily prevents a person from being a
person of good moral character.”185 The court in that case refused to
extend the immigration statute to include other morality offenses not
specifically mentioned in the statute.186
Housing cases show a similar change in values regarding illicit sex.
In New York in 1971, a court held that a landlord could not refuse to
rent to unmarried couples under New York’s Rent, Eviction, and
Rehabilitation Regulations, which allowed landlords to evict tenants for
any “immoral or illegal purpose.”187 The judge held that the
Regulations did not apply because fornication was not illegal in New
York, was not immoral under the “standards of the day,” and did not
harm anyone.188 Beginning in the 1980s, challenges under states’ antidiscrimination statutes were repeatedly upheld, and landlords were not
permitted to refuse to rent apartments to unmarried couples.189
181. Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105, 105 (2d Cir. 1935).
182. Id.
183. Petition of R———, 56 F. Supp. 969, 970–71 (D. Mass. 1944).
184. Id. at 971.
185. In re Sotos, 221 F. Supp. 145, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1958)).
186. Id.
187. Edwards v. Roe, 327 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
188. Id.
189. Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Alaska 1989)
(“[T]he Foremans refused to rent the apartment only after they learned that Hohman and Kiefer
were not married. This constitutes unlawful discrimination based on marital status.”); Hess v.
Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm’n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“As no legitimate
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However, this is not a consistent trend; some courts have refused to
extend these statutes’ protection to unmarried couples seeking to
cohabitate.190 One court refused to do so because it did not want to
impliedly repeal an existing criminal cohabitation statute.191 The
addition of arguments regarding the landlord’s religious views and the
Free Exercise Clause has also caused inconsistent rulings among
various states.192 For example, at least one court has upheld a
landlord’s decision based in part on the judge’s own moral beliefs.193
Engaging in criminal fornication or adultery was also used in torts
cases to bar recovery for being given a sexually transmitted disease

business interest exists to justify appellants’ practice, respondent properly found that appellants
unlawfully discriminated against real parties based on their marital status.”); Munroe v. 344 E.
76th Realty Corp., 448 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding a landlord could not
evict tenant based on marital status).
190. Hoy v. Mercado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (“We conclude that the
protections of Executive Law § 296(5)(a) do not extend to complainants in these circumstances
because the denial of housing to a cohabiting couple does not constitute unlawful discrimination
on the basis of “marital status.’”); Cnty. of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 717–18 (Wis.
1993) (“Chapter 31 proscribes discrimination based on the state or condition of being married, the
state or condition of being single, and the like. Norman refused to rent to the prospective tenants
in this case because they intended to live together. Living together is ‘conduct’ not ‘status.’”).
191. McCready v. Hoffius, 564 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 586 N.W.2d
723 (Mich. 1998), vacated in part, 593 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1999) (“The Legislature presumably
was aware that the above statute criminalized lewd and lascivious cohabitation. Because the
Legislature would not have intended the Civil Rights Act to insulate criminal conduct, unmarried
cohabitation is not protected conduct under the act.”); see Mister v. A.R.K. P’ship, 553 N.E.2d
1152, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding the existence of criminal fornication statute supported
court’s refusal to extend anti-discrimination statute to an unmarried couple who were denied an
apartment due to their marital status); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990)
(“[T]he term ‘marital status’ will not be construed in a manner inconsistent with this state’s
policy against fornication and in favor of the institution of marriage.”); N.D. Fair Hous. Council,
Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 561–62 (N.D. 2001) (refusing to extend Human Rights Act
because of existing statute criminalizing cohabitation).
192. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 267, 277 (Alaska 1994)
(enforcing these provisions against an Anchorage landlord who refused to rent to unmarried
couples on religious grounds did not violate the landlord’s right to free exercise of his religion);
Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996) (holding that landlord is
not permitted to discriminate based on marital status despite religious views); Att’y Gen. v.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass. 1994) (holding state must have compelling interest to
preclude landlord from refusing to rent to unmarried couple on religious grounds); see State v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (holding landlord’s religious beliefs outweigh state’s
interest in allowing cohabitating couples to rent apartments).
193. The French Court stated:
Before abandoning fundamental values and institutions, we must pause and take stock
of our present social order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising
underclass without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets; children with
only one parent or no parent at all; and children growing up with no one to guide them
in developing any set of values.
French, 460 N.W.2d at 11 (footnote omitted).
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because the fornicating plaintiff had engaged in an illegal act and
therefore had “unclean hands.”194 The fact that the crime of fornication
was no longer being prosecuted in 1990 did not appear to enter into the
court’s analysis, and it was not until the fornication statute was declared
unconstitutional in 2003 as a result Lawrence v. Texas that the unclean
hands defense was no longer made available in similar cases.195
Perhaps the civil cases most closely related to adultery and
fornication criminal cases are those concerning divorce and alimony
payments. From the 1910s to the 1950s, a woman who was separated
from her husband was not entitled to alimony in the final divorce if she
was cohabitating with another man.196 Courts actually considered her
behavior adultery, despite the fact that her marriage was in the process
of being dissolved.197 Many of these early cases draw a distinction
between separation and final divorce, so that once the divorce was final,
the wife’s subsequent sexual behavior would not affect alimony
payments.198
However, by the mid-1990s, some courts were refusing to terminate
alimony payments absent evidence that the cohabitating spouse was
receiving financial support from another source.199 At least one court
explicitly rejected any moral arguments to the contrary:
[Prior cases] clearly reflect a moral judgment that a divorced woman
should not engage in sexual relations; the penalty for such activity is
forfeiture of her right to support from her ex-husband. A secondary
rationale in these cases for termination of alimony is the presumption
that the divorced woman’s partner/cohabitant is providing financial
support, thereby eliminating or reducing her need for support from her
ex-husband. We find that only the latter issue-that of support-is

194. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 721 (Va. 1990).
195. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370–71 (Va. 2005).
196. Courson v. Courson, 129 A.2d 917, 920 (Md. 1957); Burton v. Burton, 135 N.Y.S. 248,
248–49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912); Cariens v. Cariens, 40 S.E. 335, 336–37 (W. Va. 1901).
197. Courson, 129 A.2d at 918; Burton, 135 N.Y.S. at 248–49.
198. Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Cole v. Cole, 35
Ill. App. 544, 544 (1890); Abbott v. Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. 1979); Sloan v. Cox, 5
Tenn. 75, 75 (Tenn. 1817).
199. DeMaria v. DeMaria, 724 A.2d 1088 (Conn. 1999); Husband B. W. D. v. Wife B. A. D.,
436 A.2d 1263 (Del. 1981); Glass v. Glass, 537 A.2d 552 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987); Maclaren v.
Maclaren, 616 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Schober, 379 N.W.2d 46
(Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140 (Me. 1980); Hammonds v.
Hammonds, 641 So. 2d 1211 (Miss. 1994); Bisig v. Bisig, 469 A.2d 1348 (N.H. 1983); Moell v.
Moell, 649 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Perri v. Perri, 608 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153
(Okla. 1983); Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905 (S.D. 1980).
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properly before the court in its consideration of a request for alimony
reduction or termination.200

However, some states continue to terminate alimony payments for
cohabitating ex-spouses, even after their divorce is finalized.201 Some
of these courts’ decisions to terminate alimony are the result of state
statutes that specifically require alimony to cease if an ex-spouse
cohabitates with another person.202 Others are the direct result of the
judge’s moral disapproval of an ex-spouse’s practice of cohabitation.203
Similarly, even as late as 1979, an ex-spouse successfully used the
other’s fornication to gain custody of the couple’s child.204
Finally, these civil cases also highlight that there is a divide among
the states regarding the importance of criminalizing adultery and
fornication. As the following two charts show, only a few states
currently have adultery or fornication laws. Although adultery laws are
much more common, there appears to be no region of the country where
such laws predominate.205 Moreover, all of the states that do have
fornication laws also have adultery laws. It is also noteworthy that a
couple of states have retained their adultery or fornication laws even
though their courts ruled those laws unconstitutional.
In sum, both civil and criminal cases evince a change in attitudes
towards pre- and extra-marital sex. Evidence of general attitudes and
judicial opinions illustrate that American society has become more
accepting of adultery and fornication and less willing to allow the law to
intervene in these activities.

200. Hammonds, 641 So. 2d at 1215–16.
201. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Blackwell, 383 So. 2d 196 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Jones v. Jones,
387 So. 2d 217 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Paul v. Paul, 60 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Del. 2012); In re
Marriage of McGowan, 405 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917
(Utah Ct. App. 1995).
202. Capper v. Capper, 451 So. 2d 359 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Paul, 60 A.3d at 1082; In re
Marriage of McGowan, 405 N.E.2d at 1156.
203. McHann v. McHann, 383 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1980) (“To hold otherwise would be to
condone adultery and in effect would penalize a divorcee for marrying but reward her for
cohabitation without benefit of marriage.”); see McRae v. McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Miss.
1980) (noting “We are of the further view that her abode with the man for more than a year,
openly living in adultery, enduring the embarrassment of it, and, in addition by silence, setting
that kind of example before her daughters constituted a material change in the circumstances of
the parties and that, by her unconscionable conduct, she forfeited her right to future alimony by
her repudiation of the right thereto.”).
204. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979).
205. It is noteworthy that the West Coast appears to be the only region where fornication and
adultery are legal in every state.
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III. HOW EVIDENTIARY ISSUES LED TO
DECREASED PROSECUTIONS
In addition to general cultural changes, evidentiary standards for
adultery and fornication prosecutions have also changed over time.
More specifically, in early cases, wholly circumstantial evidence was
sufficient for a conviction to be upheld.206 However, over time,
206. As the cases below show, even innocent-seeming activities could be considered evidence
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evidentiary standards have become stricter, resulting in more overturned
convictions.207 These changed evidentiary standards show what courts
and juries believed was relevant when determining guilt. Moreover, the
decreasing availability of circumstantial evidence of adultery or
fornication provides insight into the makeup of communities and the
importance of these crimes to them. In short, evidentiary standards,
combined with cultural evidence, provide a more complete picture of
the purpose and utility of adultery and fornication laws over time.
Historically, evidentiary standards have had a significant impact on
prosecutions of adultery and fornication. For example, even during the
colonial period, some courts were very strict about what evidence was
sufficient to convict a person of adultery.208 Judges were particularly
careful that evidence was sufficient for sex crimes that carried the death
penalty.209 Due to evidentiary issues, some states created lesser crimes,
such as the crime of a man being found in bed with another man’s wife,
which had a lesser penalty than the crime of adultery.210 Likewise, if a
court could not convict for adultery or fornication, it could convict for
other lascivious actions “tending to adultery.”211 In spite of these
limitations, colonial courts generally allowed a wide variety of
circumstances to count as evidence of illicit sexual activity. Permissible
evidence became more restricted over the years as courts began to
impose stricter standards on what kinds of evidence were sufficient to
show that the defendant had committed adultery or fornication.
A. Historical Evidentiary Standards
It was more likely in the past that people would be prosecuted and
convicted for adultery and fornication than it is today. As seen in
Figure 4, until the 1930s it was probable that an adultery conviction
would be upheld on appeal; but, beginning in the 1870s, courts became
increasingly likely to reverse and remand for a new trial. The likelihood
of a pure reversal also increased steadily from the 1830s, peaking in the
1920s.
Indictment errors, never a large category, disappeared
of illicit sex. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 17 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (stating that a
man and woman going to the theater together was evidence of adultery); Burns v. State, 182 P.
738 (Okla. Crim. App. 1919) (discussing defendants going riding together several times at night
as evidence of open and notorious adultery).
207. E.g., Armstead v. State, 71 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Neb. 1955); State v. Eggleston, 77 P. 738,
740 (Or. 1904).
208. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 87.
209. Id.
210. State v. Green, 1 Kirby 87, 88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); State v. Way, 6 Vt. 311, 313–14
(1834).
211. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 103.
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completely by the 1920s, a time period that seems to be a turning point
for adultery cases.
Figure 4—Adultery Grounds for Appeal212
100
50
0

Conviction
reversed
and
remanded

As seen in Figure 5, with regard to fornication cases, indictment
issues were originally much more common than evidentiary issues, but
disappeared by the 1900s. Upheld convictions for fornication became
much more common beginning in the 1880s, and stayed common until
the 1970s, when they disappeared completely. Pure reversals and
reversals with remands stayed fairly constant from the 1850s to the
1950s. Unlike adultery cases, there were no dramatic changes in
appeals trends or numbers in the 1930s—those changes did not begin
until the 1980s.
Figure 5—Fornication Grounds for Appeal

212. For Figure 4, cases that did not involve indictment issues, or a conviction being upheld,
reversed, or reversed and remanded, have been omitted.
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The reasons for appeals also changed over time. Figures 6 and 7
show that early adultery and fornication cases often dealt with issues of
who could give evidence or the wording of the indictment, and not
whether the evidence of illicit sex was sufficient.213 As shown below,
in both adultery and fornication cases, evidentiary issues were more
common beginning in the 1920s, with procedural issues all but
disappearing until the 1970s. Many of the procedural issues that arose
in the 1970s, as noted above, dealt with new privacy challenges.
Figure 6—Adultery Evidence Issues214

Figure 7—Fornication Evidence Issues

213. See, e.g., State v. Dickinson, 18 N.C. 349, 351–52 (1835) (finding that the lower court
properly quashed the indictment alleging that the parties were not married to each other); State v.
Aldridge, 14 N.C. 331 (1832) (finding the charge insufficient because it did not allege that the
parties cohabitated adulterously); State v. Cox, 4 N.C. 597 (1817) (discussing the technical legal
issue of whether you can indict one person for fornication or if you have to indict both); Simmons
v. Commonwealth, 1 Rawle 142 (Pa. 1829) (discussing how the omission of the sex of the child
in the indictment was substantial error); Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283 (Pa. 1814)
(discussing the question of who can give evidence).
214. For Figures 6 and 7, cases have been omitted where the evidence issues were not clear.
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These results are not surprising. Early cases were routinely
composed entirely of circumstantial evidence that was used to prove the
act of fornication or adultery. Courts emphasized that because of the
secrecy involved in illicit sex, it is “ordinarily impossible to prove it,
except by circumstantial evidence.”215 As shown below, observations
of how parties behaved together in public, illegitimate children, a
“disposition” towards adultery, and even reputation could all constituted
acceptable evidence of illicit sex.
1. Observations of Behavior
Most commonly, how the parties acted together in public was used as
evidence that the parties engaged in illicit sexual activity. Being seen in
public together could be used as evidence of illicit sexual acts but was
usually insufficient to wholly support a verdict,216 especially if the
parties did not engage in visible “improper conduct” or the male
defendant’s wife was also with the parties at times.217 Likewise,
evidence of the parties riding in a car, buggy, or train together could be
insufficient for a verdict, but was admissible evidence, particularly if
the rides were at night.218 Witnesses could also report relatively
innocent physical conduct, such as the man putting his arm around the
woman’s waist, even on only one occasion.219 Likewise, lesser sexual
activities, such as kissing or playful wrestling, could provide evidence
that the parties engaged in illicit intercourse, even if not sufficient for a
conviction.220
What the couple was observed doing in private could provide

215. Crane v. People, 48 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1897); see State v. More, 88 N.W. 322 (Iowa 1901).
216. See State v. Chaney, 81 N.W. 454 (Iowa 1900) (discussing how a man and woman went
out dancing together in public until late at night); State v. Crenshaw, 17 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1929) (discussing how the parties went to the theater together).
217. See State v. Gordon, 36 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. 1945).
218. Not guilty of illicit intercourse: Brown v. State, 14 So. 2d 596, 598 (Ala. Ct. App. 1943)
(discussing how the parties rode alone in a car together); Grice v. State, 78 So. 984, 985 (Fla.
1918) (discussing how the parties rode in a car together); Hales v. State, 131 S.E. 542, 543 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1925). Guilty of illicit intercourse: State v. Austin, 13 S.E. 219 (N.C. 1891) (discussing
how a man and woman rode in a buggy together after sunset); Burns v. State, 182 P. 738 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1919) (discussing how the defendants went riding together several times at night);
State v. Snowden, 65 P. 479, 483 (Utah 1901) (discussing how a man and woman walked
together and rode together and she later bore a child).
219. Copeland v. State, 67 So. 623, 623 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915).
220. See, e.g., State v. More, 88 N.W. 322, 323 (Iowa 1901) (stating that a man kissing a
woman and laying on top of her on the bed while both were clothed showed “a strong inclination
on the part of both to indulge their passions”); State v. Wiltsey, 72 N.W. 415 (Iowa 1897)
(finding that hugging and kissing was not sufficient for a conviction); State v. Austin, 13 S.E. 219
(N.C. 1891) (discussing when a man and woman kissed as evidence of adultery). Even public
displays of affection between married couples were criticized. MURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 301.
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powerful evidence of adultery or fornication. Even engaging in normal
domestic activities—eating or working in the fields together—was used
as evidence of illicit intercourse or cohabitation.221 Locked doors and a
used bed were sometimes sufficient to show that illicit intercourse had
taken place.222 Similarly, being seen in a state of undress, either in or
out of a bed, was also evidence that the parties were engaging in illicit
intercourse.223 Indeed, staying the night in the same room where there
was only one bed has been held sufficient to show illicit intercourse
even if the parties were never observed in bed together.224 If the parties
were in a hotel room together, that would provide stronger evidence of
illicit intercourse, especially if they were caught in a state of partial

221. State v. Wade, 84 S.E. 768 (N.C. 1915); State v. Naylor, 136 P. 889, 891 (Or. 1913).
222. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 39 Ala. 554, 555 (1865) (stating that a locked door and a bed
with an imprint of two people on it was evidence of criminal intimacy); Commonwealth v.
Thrasher, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 450 (1858) (stating that a man and woman alone in his bedroom
with the door fastened, and that once between these times a witness saw [the man] take the
defendant [woman] in his arms, carry her into his bedroom, lay her upon his bed, and seat himself
on the bed beside her, was evidence of adultery), overruled by Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111
(1869). Contra Davis v. State, 17 S.E. 336 (Ga. 1893) (finding that trial court erred in indicting a
woman for fornication based only on the evidence that she was found in man’s bed, he was in his
bedclothes in the room, the door was shut, there was one bed and no pallet).
223. See, e.g., State v. Green, 1 Kirby 87, 88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (affirming adultery
indictment when defendants found in bed together with the woman undressed); Seats v. State, 50
S.E. 65 (Ga. 1905) (discussing how an unmarried woman was seen in bed in the same room with
an unmarried man, who had just got out of bed, and was still in his nightclothes); Cummings v.
State, 81 S.E. 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914) (finding defendant guilty of adultery when she and a man
were both in a state of undress and the bed had an imprint of two people); State v. Schaedler, 90
N.W. 91 (Iowa 1902) (finding defendant guilty of adultery when he and a woman were in a
bedroom together and the man was only partially dressed); Naylor, 136 P. at 891 (discussing a
man found in bed and the woman in the same room in her night clothes, with her corset and
clothes hanging on a chair near the bed); State v. Odekirk, 190 P. 777, 778 (Utah 1920) (finding
defendant guilty of adultery when he was caught in a woman’s room in a partial state of undress,
even though his wife and children lived nearby); State v. Way, 6 Vt. 311 (1834) (discussing how
a man and woman were found in bed together with their clothes on the floor); see also Burger v.
State, 6 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1888) (discussing how the defendant was found on the bed, in the night,
with the girl with whom the alleged crime was committed, and had been there for 20 minutes);
FISCHER, supra note 41, at 14 (explaining that the couple “did Ly together upon one bed . . . .”).
224. See, e.g., Ramsey v. State, 84 S.E. 984 (Ga. Ct. App. 1915) (finding defendant guilty of
adultery when he was found in a state of undress and only one of two beds appeared to have been
disturbed); State v. Higgins, 95 N.W. 244, 247 (Iowa 1903) (finding defendant guilty of adultery
when the parties boarded together in a room with only one bed); State v. Ean, 58 N.W. 898, 899
(Iowa 1894); Commonwealth v. Clifford, 13 N.E. 345, 346 (Mass. 1887) (“If a married man is
found with a woman not his wife, in a room with a bed in it, and stays through the night with her
there, that is sufficient to warrant a finding of adultery against him.”); State v. Austin, 13 S.E. 219
(N.C. 1891) (finding defendants guilty when the male defendant was seen going to the female
defendant’s room at night, sometimes stealthily, and remaining there for some hours, leaving with
his shoes off); Gill v. State, 240 P. 1073 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925) (discussing how the parties
shared a room with one bed). However, some courts required more than seeing the parties asleep
in bed together. See Cohen v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 337 (1882).
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undress or nightclothes.225 Such evidence was more compelling where
the boarding house or hotel had a reputation for lewdness.226
Courts seem to split on the issue where there were multiple beds in a
single dwelling. In some cases, if there were evidence that the
communal house had multiple rooms with beds, it was less likely that
the court would find sufficient evidence of illicit intercourse.227 In
other cases, however, simply living in the same house together was held
sufficient to show illicit sexual activity, even though the woman had
done some paid domestic service at the house and the man’s parents
both lived in the house.228 Evidence that a man had said he had visited
the defendant at night was also held sufficient to show “that a
meretricious connection had taken place between them.”229 Indeed, the
kinds of evidence courts considered as relevant to whether the parties
engaged in illicit intercourse sometimes seemed frivolous or even racist:
the defendant’s skin color, former slave status, and hairstyle have been
used as evidence of illicit sexual intercourse.230
2. Illegitimate Children
Another important area of evidence involves illegitimate children.
Courts likely began focusing on “bastardy” cases because an
illegitimate child was unquestionable evidence of fornication for an
unmarried woman.231 Illegitimate children could also provide evidence
of illicit sex against men. For example, incidents of assisting a woman
225. Warner v. State, 175 N.E. 661, 662 (Ind. 1931) (discussing a man buttoning up trousers
when answering the door and a women in bed in nightdress as evidence of cohabitating in a state
of fornication).
226. State v. Cushing, 85 A. 770, 770 (Vt. 1913) (“[P]eople do not go to such places to say
their paternosters.”).
227. See, e.g., Lightner v. State, 55 S.E. 471 (Ga. 1906) (discussing how the parties slept in
the same room but both beds were shown to have been used the next morning); State v. Coleman,
141 S.E. 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928) (discussing how there were two beds in a room, one “rumpled,”
and both parties were dressed); Winkles v. State, 61 S.E. 1128 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (discussing
how a man spent the night in same house as woman, but in a different bedroom); Grice v. State,
78 So. 984, 985 (Fla. 1918) (discussing how parties slept in different beds in the same room);
State v. Chaney, 81 N.W. 454 (Iowa 1900) (discussing how defendant and a woman occupied
different rooms in a hotel); State v. Waller, 80 N.C. 401, 402 (1879) (finding that a woman in
bed, a man up and dressed, and the other bed “not tumbled” was insufficient evidence of illicit
intercourse); Smelser v. State, 31 Tex. 95, 96 (1868) (discussing how the parties lived in the same
house in separate bedrooms); Ham v. State, 15 S.W. 405 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890) (finding that
having two bedrooms in a house and it being unclear where each party slept was insufficient to
support a conviction of fornication).
228. Van Dolsen v. State, 27 N.E. 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1891).
229. Spencer v. State, 31 Tex. 64, 65 (1868).
230. Smelser, 31 Tex. at 96 (“There was no other proof to sustain the verdict, except that the
woman had been the other defendant’s slave, was nearly white, and wore short hair.”).
231. Brown, supra note 33, at 191.
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in her childbirth or paying for a doctor were used as evidence that the
man doing so was the father.232 Evidence that a male defendant showed
any paternal inclinations to those children could also be used to show
that he engaged in illicit intercourse with their mother.233 Similarly,
children’s references to the man as their father have also been used as
evidence.234 However, even if the parties lived in the same house and
the woman had illegitimate children, courts have been willing to
overturn a fornication conviction if other potential suitors lived nearby
and could be the actual father.235
3. “Disposition” Towards Adultery or Fornication
In addition to observed acts, a person’s history could be used against
him or her in a conviction. Repeated prior sexual acts were often added
together as a “disposition” towards illicit sex. As one court put it:
Being in bed together but once raises a presumption of guilt, but the
guilt might possibly be disproved by a proper explanation of the
circumstances; but being in bed together at various and different times
cannot be satisfactorily explained consistently with innocence, and
tends to satisfy the mind of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.236

Similarly, courts were very explicit about what an “adulterous
disposition” meant and why it could be used to show later acts of
adultery or fornication:
An adulterous disposition existing in two persons toward each other is
commonly of gradual development. It must have some duration, and
does not suddenly subside. When once shown to exist, a strong
inference arises that it has had and will have continuance, the duration
and extent of which may be usually measured by the power which it
exercises over the conduct of the parties. It is this character of
permanency which justifies the inference of its existence at any
particular point of time from facts illustrating the preceding or
subsequent relations of the parties.237

232. Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala. 24, 26 (1875) (discussing how the defendant paid for a
midwife); State v. Snowden, 65 P. 479, 483 (Utah 1901) (discussing how the defendant sent after
a doctor when woman was in childbirth).
233. State v. McGlammery, 91 S.E. 371, 372 (N.C. 1917) (discussing how the defendant had
pictures of the children made).
234. Id.; State v. Wade, 84 S.E. 768 (N.C. 1915).
235. Thompson v. State, 62 S.E. 571, 572 (Ga. App. 1908) (noting that other men who lived
nearby who probably knew of the woman’s “lewd” reputation); Ham v. State, 15 S.W. 405 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1890) (noting that a number of other men lived in the same neighborhood.).
236. Baker v. United States, 1 Pin. 641, 642–43 (Wis. 1846).
237. Crane v. People, 48 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1897); see State v. More, 88 N.W. 322, 322 (Iowa
1901) (“[W]hen adulterous disposition is shown to exist between the parties at the time of the
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In short, if a couple had previously engaged in illicit sexual acts, a
jury could infer that they were “predisposed” to having sex with each
other.238 Once a “disposition” was shown, simply being seen together
later was evidence that the couple was again engaging in illicit sex.239
These prior acts could be used as evidence even though they occurred
prior to the relevant date for the statute of limitations.240 Moreover, an
adulterous inclination could be shown by evidence of innocent activities
such as riding alone together and going fishing together when the
woman’s husband was away.241
4. Reputation, Gossip, and Spying
Reputation has historically been a fertile ground for evidence in
adultery and fornication cases. In colonial times, communities were
organized so that neighbors could watch each other.242 Neighbors saw
it as their duty to investigate those who lived nearby, including by
observing any lascivious behavior.243 In colonial New England, for
example, older women acted as monitors to prevent younger women
from acting promiscuously.244 In order to protect people from their
own base natures, some courts ordered all “single persons” to live with
relatives or a respectable family in their community so they could be
watched.245 Neighbors were also expected to report transgressions and
misbehavior to their church.246 Even though some women were
unwilling to report unwanted advances in order to avoid a court case
and give the malefactor the opportunity to mend his ways,247
community gossip often made that impossible. Keeping the unwanted
advances a secret was risky as well; the woman could be accused of
failing to be a “moral steward” if she did not report the advances.248

alleged act, then mere opportunity, with comparatively slight circumstances showing guilt, would
be sufficient to justify the inference that criminal intercourse has actually taken place.”); Monteith
v. State, 89 N.W. 828, 829 (Wis. 1902) (“If the adulterous disposition be shown to exist between
the parties, and they be shown to have been together in equivocal circumstances, such as would
lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable . . . man under the circumstances to the conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient.”).
238. State v. Dukes, 25 S.E. 786, 786 (N.C. 1896).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. People v. Girdler, 31 N.W. 624, 626 (Mich. 1887).
242. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 89.
243. Id.
244. Hambleton, supra note 45, at 106.
245. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 100.
246. Id. at 97.
247. Id. at 95.
248. Id.
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Indeed, the failure to report a crime could be punishable as
“concealment.”249
The Victorian Era did not curb Americans’ tendencies to spy on their
neighbors. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, community members
continued to be very willing to watch each other to discover immoral
acts, in one case even looking through cracks in the walls of another’s
house.250 In another case, a little girl saw the parties walk off into the
woods together, and because there had been gossip about a prior
relationship between the two parties, she told the woman’s mother-inlaw, who then followed the couple into the woods and saw them sitting
together.251 The mother-in-law’s testimony was later used as evidence
in the couple’s adultery trial.252
Police officers were also quite proactive in trying to catch people in
the act of illicit sex. In one instance, officers went to the woman’s
house, heard “something like bed springs making a noise,” and
immediately attempted to gain entry to investigate.253 In another case,
when a witness told police that the male defendant was going to see the
female defendant, three police officers observed the female defendant’s
home over a three-month period, hoping to catch the male defendant
visiting her.254
Unconventional relationships also led to gossip and evidence of bad
reputation. Witnesses could testify that they heard gossip that a man
and woman were living in adultery even though no one ever saw any
improper acts between them.255 Courts have also noted when couples
flouted society’s conventions by keeping house together or going out in
public together even though they were not married.256 In an early case,
an unwed woman was seen being “merry” with an unwed man, and
made him sign a statement of intent to marry her in order to stop her
neighbors from complaining.257 Later, when he began to come to her
249. Id.
250. Cohen v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 337, 338 (1882); see Commonwealth v. Durfee, 100
Mass. 146, 147 (1868) (describing witness reporting several instances of parties “sitting” together
on witness’s farm).
251. State v. Tracheal, 129 N.W. 736, 737 (Iowa 1911).
252. Id.
253. Mathis v. State, 117 S.E. 95, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923).
254. Koger v. State, 165 S.W. 577, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914); see People v. McCoy, 147
N.Y.S. 748, 749 (App. Div. 1914) (witnesses watched the building all night).
255. State v. Crenshaw, 17 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929).
256. State v. Naylor, 136 P. 889, 891 (Or. 1913); see Musfelt v. State, 90 N.W. 237, 238 (Neb.
1902) (“It is hardly conceivable that the defendant Musfelt, had his intentions toward his
codefendant been honorable, and his motives pure, would have subjected her to the scandal and
suspicion naturally arising from their conduct as disclosed by the evidence.”).
257. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 38.
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house late at night and demand admittance, she filed a complaint against
him.258 Unfortunately, witnesses described her “merry” behavior with
the man and other sailors (including sitting on their laps), and both she
and the man were fined for fornication.259 This propensity to gossip
could be used in the defendant’s favor, however. In one case, the court
found that the defendants did not commit adultery because no witnesses
saw the defendants in compromising positions together, including the
woman’s husband or any neighbors or acquaintances.260
Due to the prevalence of spying and gossip, a person could easily
gain a bad reputation. Like disposition, a person’s bad reputation for
chastity with the person with whom they were alleged to commit the
offense could be used as evidence that the defendant was more likely to
commit adultery.261 A woman’s reputation was also imputed to those
who associated with her. In one case, a man who employed a woman of
“lewd character” (because she had an illegitimate child) and who kept
her employed even though she had another bastard child while living
under his roof and in his employ, was convicted of illicit intercourse
with her despite there being no evidence of any improper acts between
them.262 On appeal, the court noted that his actions were “ground for
suspicion” but overturned his conviction partially due to the argument
that, because the man was so poor, he probably could not afford a
servant of better moral character.263 In a similar case, a man was
convicted of adultery simply because his purported mistress had
previously had a bastard child,264 and the defendant visited her and
repaired her family’s house.265 Indeed, these cases show how a woman
with a bastard child could be ostracized and seen as an object of
suspicion in the community.266
B. Modern Evidentiary Trends
Stricter evidentiary standards began to truly arise in the beginning of
the twentieth century when courts began to refuse to rely upon “mere

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. State v. Brown, 124 N.W. 899, 901 (Iowa 1910).
261. State v. Neiburg, 85 A. 769, 769 (Vt. 1913).
262. Thompson v. State, 62 S.E. 571, 571–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).
263. Id. at 572.
264. There was some evidence that the bastard child might be the defendant’s but the court
did not address the issue, as it primarily considered evidence within two years of the defendant’s
conviction. Winkles v. State, 61 S.E. 1128, 1128 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).
265. Id. at 1129.
266. Id. (“Some of the witnesses swore that the woman had a general reputation for
immorality, and that the women of the neighborhood did not visit her.”).
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suspicion and conjecture.”267 Instead, courts began to require that the
evidence “not only be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, but inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
inconsistent with every other rational hypothesis except that of his
guilt.”268 These courts required additional circumstantial evidence such
as being discovered in a bedroom partly undressed, a history of living in
the same room with one bed for several months, frequent visits with
each other, or being found lying in a bed together.269
In other words, courts needed more than circumstances simply
consistent with guilt or evidence that showed suspicion of guilt.270
Indeed, even if the parties were seen in the same room with only one
(rumpled) bed and a locked door, that alone would constitute
insufficient evidence.271 In fact, by the 1910s, attempting to commit
adultery was not sufficient to convict—if the parties had been
interrupted before they could commit the act, neither could be
convicted.272 Disposition and opportunity were also insufficient for
some courts as early as the 1880s.273 For example, the fact that the
woman worked as a servant for the man did not show that improper
relations took place, only that there was opportunity for them to act
improperly; absent any showing of improper conduct between them,

267. Armstead v. State, 71 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Neb. 1955); see State v. Thompson, 111 N.W.
319, 321 (Iowa 1907) (“The mere fact that parties may have been in each other’s company, under
such circumstances that the act might have occurred, will not alone justify the conclusion that the
offense [of adultery] has been committed.”).
268. Burgett v. State, 70 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954); see Armstead, 71 N.W.2d at
320 (“[M]ere disposition and opportunity to commit adultery are not alone sufficient to justify a
conviction, but there must be circumstances inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.”).
269. E.g., Burgett, 70 So. 2d at 430; Thompson, 111 N.W. at 321 (citing Blackman v. State, 36
Ala. 295, 295 (1860)); Eldridge v. State, 23 S.E. 832, 832 (Ga. 1895); State v. Schaedler, 90
N.W. 91, 91 (Iowa 1902); Commonwealth v. Clifford, 13 N.E. 345, 346 (Mass. 1887);
Richardson v. State, 34 Tex. 142, 143 (1870)).
270. Thompson, 111 N.W. at 320 (“If the evidence is as capable of interpretation which makes
it consistent with the innocence of the accused as of one consistent with his guilt, the meaning
should be ascribed to the evidence which accords with his innocence.”).
271. State v. Coleman, 141 S.E. 431, 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928).
272. Glover v. State, 82 S.E. 602, 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914). This was also the case in some
colonial jurisdictions. GODBEER, supra note 34, at 102.
273. People v. Girdler, 31 N.W. 624, 626 (Mich. 1887); see Thompson, 111 N.W. at 321
(“Whatever the disposition, the mere fact that the parties may have been in each other’s company,
under such circumstances that the act might have occurred, will not alone justify the conclusion
that it actually did. There must be some circumstances, in addition to the disposition and
opportunity, tending to rebut the presumption of innocence which continues until overcome by
proof.”); Commonwealth v. Donald, 161 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (“If adultery could
be inferred from the mere existence of an opportunity to commit the act, it would be unsafe for
persons of the opposite sex to meet except in the presence of others.”).
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there could be no conviction.274
Despite courts’ increasing evidentiary requirements, some juries were
still willing to convict on little evidence. For example, in one case, a
jury convicted based on one incident where the man was alone with the
woman when he ate an apple in her house, shut the door behind him,
and the woman was lying on the lounge because she was ill.275 His
conviction was overturned on appeal, but the fact that it was based on
such little evidence speaks volumes of what juries considered improper
in the early 1900s.276 Moreover, as recently as 1945, some courts were
still willing to rely upon jury verdicts using scant circumstantial
evidence because of the “secret nature” of illicit sex.277 Even as late as
the 1950s, sharing a bed, standing alone, was sufficient evidence of
illicit intercourse.278
Most appeals courts, however, began to overturn jury convictions
based solely on circumstantial evidence. Up to the 1930s, simply being
seen together at one of the parties’ houses, without any evidence of
improper conduct, was enough to convict them of open and notorious
cohabitation, but it was not enough to withstand an appeal.279
Likewise, living in the same house (with other people) and riding in a
car together was enough for another conviction of adultery in the
1940s.280 Again, the Court of Appeals overturned the verdict for lack
of evidence.281 By the 1960s, evidence that the parties twice spent the
night at each other’s houses was enough to convict, but not to withstand
appeal absent any evidence of inclination towards adultery.282 It is
noteworthy that the appeals court indicated that, had the parties stayed
in a hotel or been seen in a compromising position, the court would
have been willing to find that there was an adulterous inclination.283
Today, it appears that law enforcement believes that, without a
274. Copeland v. State, 67 So. 623, 623–24 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915); see Lightner v. State, 55
S.E. 471, 471 (Ga. 1906) (woman was the nurse of the man’s small child); State v. Chaney, 81
N.W. 454, 455 (Iowa 1900) (woman worked as a domestic in the hotel where the man was
staying).
275. Thompson, 111 N.W.at 320.
276. Id.
277. State v. Davenport, 33 S.E.2d 136, 138 (N.C. 1945) (“Some sense of natural shame,
coupled with a fear of public condemnation or, more likely, the fear of the law, drives offenses of
this nature into secret places, and usually causes those who commit them to observe the outward
forms of decency.”).
278. See Lancaster v. State, 64 So. 2d 602, 603 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953).
279. See Mathis v. State, 61 P.2d 261, 267 (Okla. Crim. App. 1936).
280. See Brown v. State, 14 So. 2d 596, 598 (Ala. Ct. App. 1943).
281. Id.
282. Commonwealth v. Donald, 161 A.2d 915, 917–18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960).
283. Id. at 918.
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confession or witness statement, transgressors must actually be caught
in the act in order to be charged with fornication, adultery or sodomy.284
The most recent adultery and fornication cases bear out this
requirement: in these cases, most of the defendants were literally caught
in the act of illicit sex, or had a witness testify that the sex act actually
occurred.285 In only a few instances, being seen in bed together without
being engaged in sexual intercourse was found to be sufficient.286 Most
of these cases involved more than sleeping in a bed—a state of undress
was also observed.287 In these modern cases, other types of evidence
were held to be insufficient.288
Accordingly, despite increased evidentiary standards, juries have
apparently remained willing to convict people of adultery or fornication
using the most circumstantial of evidence. Only judges have been
willing to strictly enforce evidentiary requirements.289
Perhaps
unsurprisingly, it is judges who have created a substantive right to
privacy and enforced it against legislative incursions.290 In contrast,
several states have been willing to forgo protecting marriage in related
areas—all fifty states now have no-fault divorce, and only a very few
states retain “heartbalm” or alienation of affection torts291—but have
284. See CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 106.
285. See Wilson v. State, 39 So. 2d 250, 253 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948) (testimony of female
defendant’s daughter); Horne v. State, 186 S.E.2d 542, 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (witness
described illicit sex act); Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. 1983)
(defendant seen by police having sexual intercourse in the back of a van); Dale v. State, 449 P.2d
921, 924 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (paramour testified).
286. See Lancaster v. State, 64 So. 2d 602, 603 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953); State v. Stout, 198
S.W.2d 364, 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); State v. Robinson, 176 S.E.2d 253, 254 (N.C. Ct. App.
1970).
287. See State v. Kleiman, 85 S.E.2d 148, 150 (N.C. 1954) (female defendant answered door
to officers in a thin negligee, and male defendant found hiding in bedroom closet, completely
nude). See generally Lawson v. State, 33 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948) (husband found his
wife and the defendant in bed together, asleep and only in their underclothing).
288. See, e.g., Burgett v. State, 70 So. 2d 429, 430 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (defendants seen
together “about the premises and working in the fields” but no evidence that they occupied the
same room or bed); Armstead v. State, 71 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Neb. 1955) (defendants seen
together in his trailer, female defendant dressed in housecoat and performed chores); State v.
Gordon, 36 S.E. 143, 143–44 (N.C. 1945) (defendant seen with alleged paramour in public,
paramour lived in same house with defendant and his wife, paramour seen sleeping in a different
bed from defendant); Commonwealth v. Donald, 161 A.2d 915, 917–918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)
(defendants frequently seen in each other’s company in public, defendants seen kissing, male
defendant’s car seen outside female defendant’s apartment until late in the night, male defendant
had key to female defendant’s apartment); Gordon v. State, 346 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1961) (uncorroborated confession of defendant).
289. See Burgett, 70 So. 2d at 430; Armstead 71 N.W.2d at 320; Donald, 161 A.2d at 915.
290. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 971, 976 (2006).
291. See Lance McMillian, Adultery as Tort, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1987, 1991 (2012).
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kept their criminal adultery and fornication laws. In addition, these
remaining statutes can still affect people and appear to be difficult to
exorcise from statute books either legislatively or judicially.
IV. REMAINING EFFECTS AND STANDING ISSUES
Although some believe that adultery and fornication should remain
crimes, the fact is that prosecutions under these statutes have all but
disappeared in recent decades. For most Americans, a criminal charge
for fornication or adultery would be unthinkable and inappropriate. In
other words, these statutes have become completely obsolete for most
people, which raises the question: should we get rid of them and, if so,
how?
The problem of “obsolete” statutes has existed for decades,292 and
there is no consensus regarding how those laws should be treated once
revived by a new prosecution. On one hand, courts almost routinely
enforce statutes that, to the public, may seem unfair or absurd.293 On
the other hand, criminal statutes that are only sporadically enforced can
also raise constitutional challenges of discriminatory enforcement in
violation of the Due Process Clause. Changing public policy can lead to
other potential constitutional challenges as people begin to see their
rights differently, which further weakens the obsolete statute’s viability.
However, American courts have roundly rejected the doctrine of
desuetude, which causes statutes to lapse and become unenforceable by
a long habit of non-enforcement.294 Consequently, any statute, no
matter how old or sporadically applied, may still be enforced. 295
Although the public has shown declining interest in criminalization
of adultery and fornication, and even if existing fornication and adultery
laws have a questionable constitutional status, they remain in force,
often as a symbol of the legislature’s disapproval of those acts.296
Efforts to repeal these laws are uncommon and, when they do occur, are
frequently met with resistance, particularly from religious groups.297
Moreover, judicial challenges to these laws are extremely difficult

292. The problem was discussed as far back as 1930. Frederick K. Beutel, Valuation As a
Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1302 (1929); see
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2–6 (Harvard Univ. Press.
1982).
293. CALABRESI, supra note 292, at 6.
294. Mark Peter Henriques, Desuetude and Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to
Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1070–71 (1990).
295. Id.
296. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 281–82.
297. See id. at 281; Viator, supra note 16, at 860.
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due to standing issues. In part to protect separation of powers, courts
will not hear a case unless it meets the “case or controversy”
requirement of Article III of the Constitution.298 Only a plaintiff who
has standing—a real “case or controversy”—can successfully bring a
case to court.299 And to have standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
he or she has suffered an injury in fact; (2) there is a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) it is likely
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.300
With regard to criminal statutes, a plaintiff has standing only if he or
she has been prosecuted under the statute or he or she can show a “real
and immediate threat” of a future prosecution.301 Because fornication
and adultery statutes are no longer being prosecuted and the evidentiary
standards are now so high, putative plaintiffs have been repeatedly
prevented from challenging these statutes due to a lack of standing.302
Plaintiffs cannot show injury in fact, because prosecutors typically
argue that they will not prosecute these crimes and, therefore, courts
routinely reject plaintiffs’ arguments that they “fear” prosecution.303
Even Lawrence v. Texas was an aberration—the fact that it made it to
court in the first place was the result of an unusual combination of the
personalities of the defendants and the arresting officers, and a series of
well-placed homosexual activists.304
Though adultery and fornication are not routinely prosecuted, they
remain crimes and can still be used to arrest people. Juveniles are
particularly vulnerable to convictions for fornication because courts are
more willing to overrule their asserted privacy rights and because
Lawrence v. Texas did not explicitly address sexual acts with and by
minors.305 For example, in 1996, an Idaho district attorney brought
fornication cases against pregnant teenage girls and used these
convictions to try to deter teenagers from having sex.306 These crimes
298. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
299. See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 441 (2007).
300. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1326 (10th Cir. 1997).
301. D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2004).
302. See id. at 976 (sodomy law challenge failed for lack of standing); Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d
1282, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1206–1207 (4th Cir. 1986).
303. See D.L.S., 374 F.3d at 976 (sodomy law challenge failed for lack of standing); Pryor,
344 F.3d at 1283; Duling, 782 F.2d at 1206–1207 (cohabitation law challenge).
304. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 54, 81, 117–18, 145.
305. See In re N.A., 539 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). However, this willingness is
limited to juveniles under the state’s age of consent. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ga.
2003).
306. James Brooke, Idaho County Dusts off Fornication Law, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 15 1996,
12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/524859/IDAHO-COUNTY-DUSTS-OFF-FOR
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have also been resurrected periodically against adults. In 2004, a man
convicted of adultery was going to challenge the constitutionality of his
conviction.307 However, he later decided to not pursue the challenge
and was instead sentenced to community service.308
Sodomy law prosecutions appear to be particularly likely to
resurface, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas.
For example, in 2009, El Paso cops told two men in a restaurant to stop
kissing because their act violated the state’s “homosexual conduct
law.”309 Even more recently, in 2013, many gay men were arrested and
charged with sodomy in Baton Rouge, even though the police knew that
the law was not constitutional.310 The Baton Rouge district attorney’s
office refused to prosecute these cases, which meant that those arrested
did not have to go through a criminal trial, but also meant that they were
unable to challenge Louisiana’s sodomy law.311
The shame associated with being charged with a consensual illicit sex
crime means that people are even less likely to challenge their
convictions, particularly if the punishment is something minor, such as
a fine.312 However, even without prosecutions, existing fornication and
adultery criminal laws also carry less tangible harms such as the stigma
associated with engaging in private acts that are, at least technically,
criminal.313 Courts, including the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,
have recognized the stigmatic harm associated with laws criminalizing
these consensual sexual acts.314 The crime of sodomy appears to be

NICATION-LAW.html?pg=all.
307. John F. Kelly, Va. Man Challenges State’s Adultery Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2004, at
B01.
308. Jonathan Turley, When Lust and the Law Collide, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 15, 2004, at
A19.
309. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 281.
310. La. City Police Arrested Men under Sodomy Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 29, 2013,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/28/louisiana-sodomy-arrests/2
595071/.
311. Id. The Sheriff later apologized and said he would try to have the unconstitutional parts
of the law repealed, but commentators believe it is unlikely that Louisiana’s conservative
legislature would be willing to repeal any part of the existing sodomy law. Jim Mustian,
Gautreaux Issues Apology, Begins Push to Have La. Law Erased, ADVOCATE (July 31, 2013),
http://theadvocate.com/home/6641204-125/gautreaux-issues-apology-begins-push. In this case,
the commentators’ skepticism was well founded: a bill to repeal Louisiana’s sodomy law was
rejected by the state’s House of Representatives. Louisiana: Anti-Sodomy Law Stands,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 15, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/us/louisia
na-anti-sodomy-law-stands.html?_r=1.
312. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 108.
313. Healy, supra note 299, at 417; see Lee, supra note 15.
314. Healy, supra note 299, at 417; see State v. Morales 826 S.W.2d 201, 202–03 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992).
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particularly stigmatized, with police, legislators and litigants focusing
on their disgust with homosexual sex.315 However, unless a plaintiff
can show that he or she was denied equal treatment on the basis of
being part of a stigmatized group, he or she will still not have standing
to challenge the law that creates the stigma.316 Courts, therefore,
currently do no present a viable path to erasing adultery and fornication
statutes from the books.
CONCLUSION
The longevity of adultery and fornication laws can be explained by
looking at why those laws were created in the first place and how their
purposes have adapted over time. Although no longer enforced with
any regularity, they retain a symbolic presence that can be used by
opportunistic groups and individuals, even though they are probably
unconstitutional. It is this remaining utility that should be most
concerning to legal scholars and the public. Although these laws
undoubtedly implicate privacy rights, they likewise implicate shame and
embarrassment, which makes it unlikely that those targeted by these
laws will be willing to fight for their repeal. Even those brave enough
to challenge these laws are routinely blocked by standing issues, making
it extremely unlikely that these criminal laws can be challenged in
court. Similarly, due to the vocal disapproval of religious and
conservative groups, it is unlikely that legislatures will repeal these
laws. These laws, therefore, will remain in limbo, unrepealed and
unable to be challenged. Perhaps if the culture continues to change,
they will finally be relegated to history.

315. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 99–100, 165, 203–06.
316. Healy, supra note 299, at 428.

